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Abstract
This Note discusses the need for a modern international legal regime that would address nav-
igational and environmental safety in the Turkish Straits in a manner consistent with customary
international law of the transit passage through the straits used for international navigation. Part
I provides an overview of the recent history of the Turkish Straits and the legal regimes regulat-
ing navigation in the Turkish Straits and other straits used for international navigation. Part II
explores the positions and arguments of the parties involved in the dispute over the legality of
the 1994 Turkish Regulations. Part III proposes that the circumstances surrounding this conflict
warrant the termination of the Treaty of Montreux and adoption of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea22 (”UNCLOS”) as the binding legal regime of the Turkish Straits. Part
III argues that this action will supply contemporary and internationally-accepted rules of transit
through the Turkish Straits and will provide an authoritative international tribunal to serve as an
independent arbitrator between the parties. This Note concludes that UNCLOS’s regime of transit
passage through the Turkish Straits should help to decrease the possibility of confrontation in the
region and to address Turkey’s navigational and environmental safety concerns.
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INTRODUCTION
The international community rarely accepts the unilateral
action of one government if the action affects the rights of the
international community.' Although an action may be justified
by a policy of environmental protection, the international com-
munity is likely to challenge it.2 One such challenge occurred
when Turkey unilaterally adopted the Maritime Traffic Regula-
tions for the Turkish Straits and Marmara Region' ("1994 Turk-
ish Regulations") in 1994.' Several nations' that depend on the
* J.D. Candidate, 2001, Fordham University School of Law. The author would like
to thank Prof. Joseph C. Sweeney of Fordham University School of Law for his helpful
comments.
1. See, e.g., Martin H. Belsky, Using Legal Principles to Promote the "Health" of an Ecosys-
tem, 3 TuLsAJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 183 (1996) (discussing what responses may be appro-
priate to challenges of laws and policies enacted to protect environment).
2. See id. at 183 (noting that environment protection policies justifying such pro-
grams and laws that provide for different rules as to activities that affect human health,
water quality, resource conservation, air quality, land use, oceans, or coasts are under
challenge in United States and worldwide).
3. MARITIME TRAFFic REGULATIONS FOR THE TURKISH STRAITS AND THE MARMARA RE-
GION (entered into force July 1, 1994) (visited Nov. 15, 1998) <http://inter.mfa.gov.tr/
GRUPF/default.asp?Param@grupf/marimenu.htm> (on file with the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal) [hereinafter 1994 TURKISH REGULATIONS].
4. See Michael Rank, Russia and Turkey Clash over Control of Bosphorus, REUTERS, July
25, 1997 (reporting Russia's complaint that Turkey is illegally interfering with shipping
in Straits of Dardanelles and Bosporus ("Turkish Straits" or "Straits")). A Russian offi-
cial, who asked not to be identified, said that "Turkey tackles this problem illegally ....
They have adopted a fanatical nationalist approach that assumes that if countries like
Turkey go it alone they can unilaterally impose their own rules." Id.; see Maryann Bird,
The Dire Straits: Is Turkey Making One of the World's Busiest Seaways Safer, or Just Reaching for
Oil Profits?, TIME, Mar. 24, 1997, at 44 (discussing controversy between Russia and Tur-
key over Maritime Traffic Regulations for the Turkish Straits and Marmara Region
("1994 Turkish Regulations")).
5. See Bird, supra note 4, at 44 (explaining that Greece and Russia, most frequent
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Straits of Dardanelles and Bosporus 6  ("Turkish Straits" or
"Straits") for shipping to and from the Black Sea ports chal-
lenged the 1994 Turkish Regulations.7 Those nations claim that
the 1994 Turkish Regulations violate the 1936 Convention Re-
garding the Regime of the Straits8 ("Treaty of Montreux" or
"Treaty") that guarantees free and unhampered passage of com-
mercial ships through the Turkish Straits.9
users of Straits, as well as other countries such as Romania, Bulgaria, and Ukraine are
sensitive about 1994 Turkish Regulations); see also Alan Abrams, Ship Collision in Bospho-
rus Kills 15-Turkey Feared Accident Before Tanker Disaster, J. COM., Mar. 15, 1994, at 8B
(explaining that Turkish Straits is sole outlet to sea for Ukrainian Port of Odessa, Rus-
sian ports of Novorossiysk and Rostov-na-Donu, and Romania's ports).
6. See 3 THE NEw ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 884 (15th ed. 1994) (noting that Dar-
danelles is narrow strait in northwestern Turkey, 38 miles long, linking Aegean Sea with
Sea of Marmara). Dardanelles' width varies from three quarters of a mile to four miles.
Id. It lies between the peninsula of Gallipoli in Europe (northwest) and the mainland
of Asia Minor (southeast). Id. Dardanelles' average depth is 180 feet, reaching a maxi-
mum of 300 feet in the narrowest central section. Id. The waters are rich in various
kinds of fish that migrate between the Black and Aegean seas. Id.; see 2 THE NEW ENCY-
CLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, supra, at 402 (noting that Bosporus, also spelled Bosphorus,
unites Black Sea and Sea of Marmara and separating parts of Asian Turkey (Anatolia)
from European Turkey). The Bosporus is 19 miles long, with a maximum width of 23
miles at the northern entrance and a minimum width of 2450 feet. Id. Its depth varies
from 120 to 408 feet in midstream. Id. The Bosporus is heavily fished because the
channel is a seasonal migration route for fish to and from the Black Sea. Id.; see Bird,
supra note 4, at 44 (explaining that currently about 50,000 ships and about 2000 ferries
and smaller passenger boats pass through straits annually). "They, and countless fish-
ing, cruise and leisure craft, contribute to making the straits one of the most crowded
waterways in the world-four times busier than the Panama Canal. Most of the traffic is
made up of tankers." Id.
7. See Bird, supra note 4, at 44 (reporting that "a host of neighbor nations say the
regulations violate the Treaty of Montreux" and that Greece and several former Soviet
republics view introduction of 1994 Turkish Regulations as Turkey's move "to tighten
shipping regulations in the straits as a grab for both regional power and oil money"); see
also An Accident Waiting to Happen, J. COM., Nov. 29, 1994, at 6A (reporting that Russia,
Bulgaria, and Romania are opposed to any interference with shipping in Turkish
Straits); see also Nigel Lowry, Turkey Pledges Action over Bosporus Safety, LLOYD'S LIST INT'L,
July 16, 1997, 1997 WL 17819012, at *I (explaining that "Russia and Ukraine, which are
stepping up oil exports from the Black Sea, have been particularly strident in their
objections").
8. Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits, July 20, 1936, 173 L.N.T.S. 213
(entered into force Nov. 9, 1936) [hereinafter Treaty of Montreux]. Convention Re-
garding the Regime of the Straits ("Treaty of Montreux" or "Treaty") was adopted by
the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, Australia, Bulgaria, France, Greece, Japan, Romania,
Turkey, and Yugoslavia. Id. at 215 n.2.
9. See Safety Rules Revamp for Turkish Straits, LLOYD'S LIST INT'L, Mar. 4, 1998, 1998
WL 9965830, at *3 (reporting that "several countries, notably Russia, objected that the
rules were an infringement of the Montreux Convention"); see also Geoff Winestock,
Russia Hits Turkey's Plan for Controls on Straits,J. CoM.,July 1, 1994, at lB (reporting that
"Russia had sent a memorandum to the Turkish Embassy in Moscow, calling on it to
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In response, Turkey states that the 1994 Turkish Regula-
tions do not violate the Treaty of Montreux ° and that Turkey
enacted them to alleviate the great danger of pollution that
could result from collisions between increasing number of oil
tankers and other vessels currently sailing through the Straits.1'
In addition, Turkey threatens to stop tankers carrying oil 12 from
passing through the Straits' 3 and urges oil exporters to invest in
abandon the new shipping rules through the Black Sea straits on the grounds that they
contradict accepted norms of international sea law"). The memorandum stated that
1994 Turkish Regulations contained "unjustified restrictions, which could even have
the effect of stopping shipping in the straits." Id. Grigory Karasin, a spokesman for the
Russian Foreign Ministry, explained that Turkish Straits "were vital to Russia and the
other Black Sea states" and that "Russia could not accept a system that gives Turkey the
right to effectively deny passage through the straits to certain categories of ships." Id.;
see Treaty of Montreux, supra note 8, art. 2, at 219 (guaranteeing complete freedom of
passage for commercial vessels through Turkish Straits in time of peace). Article 2 of
the Treaty of Montreux provides that "[i] n time of peace, merchant vessels shall enjoy
complete freedom of transit and navigation in the Straits, by day and by night, under
any flag with any kind of cargo, without any formalities." Id.
10. See Gunduz Aybay, Turkey's Role Over Straits Precautions, LLOYD'S LIST INT'L, July
25, 1997, 1997 WL 17819278, at *5 (explaining Turkish position that 1994 Turkish Reg-
ulations do not violate Treaty of Montreux because Turkish Straits are internal waters
of Turkey rather than international waterway and because Treaty of Montreux merely
provides for freedom of passage, thus leaving power to organize traffic through Turkish
Straits to Turkey).
11. See Sibel Akbay, Turkey Seeks to Limit Bosporus Tanker Transit, LLOYD'S LIST INT'L,
May 27, 1996, 1996 WL 6275800, at *3 (quoting Turkish Maritime Undersecretary Rezat
Ozkan, who stated that Turkey cannot allow more oil passage without harming people
or environment); see also Yusuf Kanli, Gonensay Hints at New Measures for Oil and Other
Cargo Vessels, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, May 14, 1996 (reporting that Turkish Foreign Minis-
ter Emre Gonensay stated that Turkey's experiences showed that additional security
measures were required in order to cope with heavy traffic that increased dangers for
Istanbul). Summarizing Turkey's new Straits policy as taking "adequate measures to
decrease the risk of collisions or accidents and to decrease the impact of accidents," the
minister mentioned that new regulations "may ask for certain standards for oil and
other cargo vessels." Id.; see Frank McDonald, Turkey Worried 250% More Supertankers in
Bosphorus Will Mean More Oil Disasters, IR. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1997, at 10 (quoting Turkish
Environment Minister, Imrem Aykut, who said at "The Black Sea in Crisis" symposium
that Turkey is concerned about prospect of another 150 supertankers a year transport-
ing oil from Caspian Sea to Mediterranean through Bosphorus, which is already one of
most world's hazardous waterways).
12. See Thomas Land, Oil Fuels Russia-Turkey Wrangle, LLOYD'S LIST INT'L, Feb. 27,
1996, 1996 WL 6273759, at *5 (discussing export of oil from Caspian Sea region by
tankers through Turkish Straits). The Caspian Sea oil reserves rival those of the Persian
Gulf. Id. Only two fields of known reserves in Azerbaijan are 4.5 billion barrels. Id.
Their estimated capacity is several times greater. Id.
13. See Dev George, Caspian's Russian Route a Certainty, OFFSHORE, Nov. 1995, at 8
(quoting Turkish official who said that Turkey will not let Russia move oil through
Turkish Straits); see also Land, supra note 12, at *5 (explaining economic reasons of
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the construction of an oil pipeline through Turkey. 4 In con-
trast, the opposing countries 15 attack the 1994 Turkish Regula-
tions, claiming large economic losses caused by vessel delays at
the Straits, 6 and reject Turkey's environment protection argu-
ments.17 Because the 1994 Turkish Regulations threaten Rus-
sia's prospects for big revenues from oil export,' 8 Russia may
even resort to the use of force to resolve this conflict.'9
Turkey's imposition of restrictions on tanker traffic carrying Caspian oil). Such imposi-
tions will promote the alternative oil export route by pipeline through Turkey. Id.
14. See Land, supra note 12, at *5 (discussing Turkish US$1.8 billion project to
construct 1685 kilometer oil pipeline through Turkey, which would reactivate Turkish
oil terminal at Ceyhan, which has been idle for several years); see also Akbay, supra note
11, at *3 (reporting on Russia's claim that Turkey uses 1994 Turkish Regulations to
force construction of oil pipeline from Baku, Azerbaijan to Turkish southern oil termi-
nal of Ceyhan ("Baku-Ceyhan pipeline")); Dev Goerge, Blocking the Bosporus, OFFSrtoRE,
July 1994, at 7 (stating that without trans-Turkey pipeline for transporting oil, when oil
fields begin renewed production, estimated 45 million tons of crude and 13 billion
square meters of gas will be transported annually by tankers through Turkish Straits).
Thus, current number of vessels transiting the Turkish Straits will double and will likely
result in gridlock, environmental disaster, or both. Id.
15. See Bird, supra note 4, at 44 (identifying opposing parties as Black Sea coun-
tries such as Russia, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, and Ukraine).
16. See id. (describing Greek, Russian, Romanian, Bulgarian, and Ukrainian ship-
owners frustration over delays causing multi-million dollar losses due to traffic in Turk-
ish Straits); see also Land, supra note 12, at *5 (explaining that Russia's claim is that
Turkey is unreasonably making hundreds of Russian vessels wait to enter Straits for
many hours).
17. See Bird, supra note 4, at 44 (describing Greece's and several former Soviet
republics' contention that Turkey tightened shipping regulations in Turkish Straits "as
a grab for both regional power and oil money"). The spokesman for Greece's
Merchant Marine Ministry, Thrasivoulos Stavridopoulos, claimed that "Turkey's envi-
ronmental argument is a bluff, an excuse for other political and economic aspirations."
Id.
18. See Land, supra note 12, at *5 (asserting that confrontation will decide Eu-
rope's access to enormous estimated oil reserves that can generate US$100 billion of
revenues over next 30 years).
19. See Debora Schweikart, Dire Straits: The International Maritime Organization in the
Bosporus and Dardanelles, 5 Y.B. INT'L L. 29, 42-43 (1996-1997) (stating that Western
countries consider use of force as viable means to protect energy reserves in Central
Asia); see also Martin Walker, Battle of the Black Stuff, GUARDIAN, Oct. 3, 1995, at T6
(noting that former Sen. Robert Dole defined world's oil and gas supplies as strategic
interest of United States). Mr. Dole said, recalling the Gulf War, that "[t]he security of
the world's oil and gas supplies remain a vital interest of the United States and its major
allies. But its borders now move north, to include the Caucasus, Siberia and Kazakh-
stan. Our forward military presence and diplomacy need adjusting." Id. Many analysts
consider the Black Sea region as a "crisis arch" that "may become a theater of major
conflicts where the West will inevitably confront the Muslim world in the 21st century."
Dmitry Sergeyev, Great Is Russia but There Is Nowhere to Retreat from Sevastopol, RuSSIAN
PRESS DiG.,June 8, 1995, 1995 WL 7718292, at *1. "[Iun the near future the Black Sea
will become a new economic gate of Europe, linking it with the Middle East, Central
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This Note discusses the need for a modern international
legal regime that would address navigational and environmental
safety in the Turkish Straits in a manner consistent with custom-
ary international law of the transit passage2 ° through the straits
used for international navigation.2 1 Part I provides an overview
of the recent history of the Turkish Straits and the legal regimes
regulating navigation in the Turkish Straits and other straits
used for international navigation. Part II explores the positions
and arguments of the parties involved in the dispute over the
legality of the 1994 Turkish Regulations. Part III proposes that
the circumstances surrounding this conflict warrant the termina-
tion of the Treaty of Montreux and adoption of the United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea22 ("UNCLOS") as the
binding legal regime of the Turkish Straits. Part III argues that
and Southeast Asia, oil-abundant Siberia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. However, the
favorable role of a bridge is now been effectively taken away from Russia." Id.
20. See William L. Schachte, Jr. & J. Peter A. Bernhardt, International Straits and
Navigational Freedoms, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 527, 530-32 (1993) (defining customary interna-
tional law of transit passage prior to United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea
("UNCLOS") as freedom of navigation and overflight in straits used for international
navigation). In addition to the international law concept of the right of transit passage
through international straits, the customary international law recognized innocent pas-
sage through a coastal state's territorial sea. Id. Prior to UNCLOS, the customary inter-
national law defined innocent passage as navigation through the territorial sea without
entering internal waters, or proceeding to or from internal waters. Id. The territorial
sea state could not interfere with innocent passage through the territorial sea and
through straits that are used for international navigation. Id.
21. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec.
10, 1982, art. 37, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122, 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1276 (entered into force
Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS] (defining straits used for international naviga-
tion as straits that connect one part of high seas or exclusive economic zone with an-
other); see also Schachte & Bernhardt, supra note 20, at 535-36 (explaining that inter-
pretive position of United States is that straits used for international navigation includes
all straits that are used or may be used for navigation; thus all straits are included).
22. UNCLOS, supra note 21, 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1-261-87. As of December 31, 1997,
158 nations signed UNCLOS and 123 states had ratified UNCLOS. MULTILATERAL
TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL, STATUS AS AT 31 DECEMBER 1997, at
799, U.N. Doc. No. ST/LEG/SER.E/16, U.N. Sales No. E.98.V2 (1998). As to the na-
tions that are the parties to the Treaty of Montreux, Australia, Yugoslavia, France, Ja-
pan, the Russian Federation, Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece have signed and ratified
UNCLOS. Id. at 799-801. The United Kingdom has signed and later adopted UNCLOS
by accession. Id. at 801. Turkey has not signed UNCLOS. Id. at 801. UNCLOS transit
passage provisions reflect customary international law regardless of whether signatory
states have ratified UNCLOS or whether non-signatories have acceded to it. Schachte &
Bernhardt, supra note 20, at 537. The United States signed UNCLOS on July 28, 1994,
and is seeking U.S. Senate advice and consent on it. George K. Walker, The Interface of
Criminal Jurisdiction and Actions Under the United Nations Charter with Admiralty Law, 20
MAR. LAw. 217, 218 (1996).
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this action will supply contemporary and internationally-ac-
cepted rules of transit through the Turkish Straits and will pro-
vide an authoritative international tribunal to serve as an in-
dependent arbitrator between the parties. This Note concludes
that UNCLOS's regime of transit passage through the Turkish
Straits should help to decrease the possibility of confrontation in
the region and to address Turkey's navigational and environ-
mental safety concerns.
I. RECENT HISTORY OF THE TURKISH STRAITS AND THE
LEGAL REGIME REGULATING NAVIGATION IN THE
TURKISH STRAITS
Since 1936, the Treaty of Montreux provided the regulatory
scheme of maritime traffic in the Turkish Straits. 23 In 1982, UN-
CLOS codified the law of the transit passage through straits used
for international navigation. 24  UNCLOS recognizes, however,
that the regimes of straits are governed by prior international
treaties. 25 The Treaty of Montreux is a prior international treaty
that regulates the Turkish Straits. 26 In 1994, Turkey enacted the
1994 Turkish Regulations to enhance the safety of navigation in
the Straits and to protect the environment. 27 Turkey contends
that these regulations are consistent with the Treaty of Mon-
treux, the international legal regime governing the Straits. 28
23. See H. Warren, Turkey and the Right to Regulate Traffic Through the Turkish Straits,
LLOYD'S LIST INT'L, Oct. 15, 1997, 1997 WL 17816375, at *12 (explaining that Treaty of
Montreux established regime for passage of ships through Turkish Straits).
24. See UNCLOS, supra'note 21, pt. III, arts. 34-45, at 1276-78 (providing rules of
passage through straits used for international navigation); see also Schachte & Bern-
hardt, supra note 20, at 535 (explaining that one of most important achievements of
UNCLOS drafters was codification of transit passage regime of international straits).
25. UNCLOS, supra note 21, art. 35(c), at 1276.
26. See id. (providing that UNCLOS does not affect "the legal regime in straits in
which passage is regulated in whole or in part by long-standing international conven-
tions in force specifically relating to such straits"); see also Schachte & Bernhardt, supra
note 20, at 538 (explaining that Article 35(c) of UNCLOS applies to Turkish Straits as
straits regulated by prior international treaty still in force).
27. See Background Note on the Regulations for the Turkish Straits (visited Jan. 18, 1999)
<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/GRUPF/default.asp?Param@GRUPF/Strait2.htm> (on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafter Background Note] (stating that
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs primary concerns for enactment of 1994 Turkish
Regulations were safety of navigation and protection of environment).
28. See Bird, supra note 4, at 44 (reporting on Turkey's position as to purposes of
enactment of 1994 Turkish Regulations and their consistency with international law).
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A. Overview of the Recent History of the Turkish Straits
Over the centuries, numerous fights over the domination of
the Turkish Straits have marked the history of this important wa-
terway.29 The Turkish Straits have been controlled by Greeks,
Persians, Romans, Byzantines, and Ottoman Turks. 0 On July
20, 1936, the Treaty of Montreux provided Turkey with sover-
eignty3 l1 over the Turkish Straits. 2 The Treaty of Montreux re-
placed the Protocol Relating to Certain Concessions Granted in
the Ottoman Empire33 ("Lausanne Treaty") signed on July 24,
1923, which regulated the Turkish Straits prior to the Treaty of
Montreux.34 Currently, the Turkish Straits are one of six key oil
tanker routes in the world.35 The Straits are also the riskiest of
29. See id. (describing Turkish Straits as "the gateway to two worlds and three seas,
they have been fought over for longer than any other waterway in history, in conflicts
stretching as far back as the Trojan War in 1200 B.C.").
30. Id.; see, e.g., S. Andrew Scharfenberg, Comment, Regulating Traffic Flow in the
Turkish Straits: A Test for Modem International Law, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 333, 339-43
(1996) (providing overview of Turkish Straits control schemes over past five centuries
and discussing in detail Treaty of Montreux, 1994 Turkish Regulations, and UNCLOS's
provisions regulating navigation through straits used for international navigation).
31. See Gunduz Aybay & Nylufer Oral, Turkey's Authority to Regulate Passage of Vessels
Through the Turkish Straits (visited Jan. 18, 1999) <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/genel/al-
laboutl.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafter Turkey's
Authority] (explaining that Treaty of Montreux gave complete control over Straits to
Turkey, but guaranteed free passage through Straits in times of peace).
32. See Treaty of Montreux, supra note 8, art. 24, at 227 (conferring sovereignty
and all regulatory rights over Turkish Straits upon Turkey); see also Turkey's Authority,
supra note 31 (explaining that prior to Treaty of Montreux, Turkey did not have mili-
tary sovereignty over Turkish Straits).
33. See Protocol Relating to Certain Concessions Granted in the Ottoman Empire,
July 24, 1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 203 [hereinafter Lausanne Treaty]. The Protocol Relating to
Certain Concessions Granted in the Ottoman Empire ("Lausanne Treaty") was signed
by representatives of Turkey, the successor to Ottoman Empire, on one side and by the
United Kingdom, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania, and the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats, and Slovenes (Yugoslavia) on other side. Id.
34. See Turkey's Authority, supra note 31 (explaining that Lausanne Treaty did not
give military sovereignty to Turkey over Straits prior to Treaty of Montreux). The signa-
tories to the Treaty of Lausanne, except Italy, signed the Treaty of Montreux, which
changed the status of the Turkish Straits by giving complete control over the Straits to
Turkey, but guaranteeing free passage through the Straits in times of peace. Id. The
Treaty of Montreux was originally intended to last for 20 years, but is still in effect. Id.
35. See Schweikart, supra note 19, at 33 (explaining that six of world's key oil
tanker routes are Strait of Hormuz from Persian Gulf to Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea,
Strait of Malacca from northern Indian Ocean into South China Sea and Pacific Ocean,
Bosporus from Black Sea to Mediterranean Sea, Suez Canal from Red Sea to Mediterra-
nean Sea, Rotterdam Harbor from North Sea to Rhine River, and Panama Canal from
Pacific Ocean to Caribbean Sea).
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these routes.3 6
In 1994, after a dramatic tanker accident in the Straits, 37
Turkey unilaterally adopted the 1994 Turkish Regulations.3
This action, augmented by conflicting oil export interests of Rus-
sia and Turkey, triggered the dispute between these nations over
the freedom of navigation through the Turkish Straits.39 Russia
and Turkey currently compete to control the movement of vast
volumes of oil exported from Caspian sources to lucrative West-
ern markets. 40 Turkey promotes the construction of a US$2.9
billion pipeline through the Turkey's territory41 ("Baku-Ceyhan
pipeline") .42 The Azerbaijan International Operating Co. 43
("AIOC"), however, may decide against constructing such a pipe-
line in the near future.4 4 Instead, the AIOC will likely rely on a
36. See id. (noting that "[t]he U.S. Energy Information Administration rated the
possibility of accidental oil supply disruptions greatest among major oil shipping lanes
for supplies moving through the Bosporus").
37. See Accidents in the Bosphorus (visited Jan. 18, 1999) <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/
GRUPF/default.asp?Param@grupf/caspian5.htm> (on file with the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal) (explaining that in March 1994, Greek Cypriot tanker Nassia col-
lided with another vessel, killing 30 seamen and spilling 20,000 tons of oil into Turkish
Straits). The escaping oil burned on the waters of the Bosporus for five days. Id.
38. See Background Note, supra note 27 (announcing introduction of 1994 Turkish
Regulations and providing safety of navigation and environmental protection concerns
justifying 1994 Turkish Regulations); see also Bird, supra note 4, at 44 (noting that Tur-
key unilaterally introduced 1994 Turkish Regulations, saying that such action was justi-
fied by safety and environmental concerns).
39. See Land, supra note 12, at *5 (arguing that "a confrontation between Russia
and Turkey which ostensibly concerns navigation rights, safety and traffic schedules in
the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits, is mainly about the two rivals jostling for position
over access to the oil and gas reserves of the Caspian region").
40. See Bird, supra note '4, at 44 (describing Turkey's efforts to establish its pres-
ence in oil-rich Central Asia and use pipeline via Turkey to bring oil to Western mar-
kets).
41. See David Ivanovich & Hillary Durgin, Long Pipeline Route Viable, Officials Say!
Option Avoiding Iran, but Not Georgia, Likely, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 13, 1998, at 2 (describ-
ing oil pipeline project to construct 1240-mile-long pipeline from the Azerbajani capi-
tal of Baku to Turkish port city of Ceyhan on Mediterranean Sea ("Baku-Ceyhan pipe-
line")).
42. See id. at 2 (explaining that "Turkey, concerned about a surge in tanker traffic
through the narrow Bosporus Straits if the Caspian becomes a major oil exporting re-
gion, has been pushing for the Ceyhan route"). Turkish President Suleyman Demirel
stated: "Baku-Ceyhan will be definitely constructed. It is the safest route and has the
backing of the United States." Id.
43. See id. (describing Azerbaijan International Operating Co. ("AIOC") as eleven
member consortium developing three offshore oil fields in Azerbaijani-claimed sector
of Caspian Sea).
44. See Letter from Julia Nanay, Director, The Petroleum Finance Company, Wash-
ington, D.C. (Jan. 13, 1999) (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (ex-
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smaller, less-expensive line to the Georgian Black Sea port of
Supsa that the AJOC is currently renovating.4 5 The AIOC may
also build a second line along that route.4 6 A report issued in
May 1998 by the Petroleum Finance Company, a Washington-
based oil consulting company, stated that the Baku-Ceyhan pipe-
line is a less practicable option.4 7 The report examined the feasi-
bility of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline and concluded that it did not
represent an attractive choice, despite support from Turkey and
the United States.48 The author of the report, Lowell Bezanis,
opined that Turkey used environmental justifications to impose
limits on the use of the Turkish Straits for transporting up to
forty-five million tons of crude oil annually-by tankers from the
plaining that AIOC's decision is not final yet and will be announced sometime in next
few months). Ms. Nanay stated:
[AIOC] is supposedly leaning toward keeping the existing northern and west-
ern [oil pipeline] routes out of Azerbaijan. One goes through Dagestan and
Chechnya with up to 100,000 barrels per day that can eventually be shipped
and the other to Supsa (100,000 barrels per day initially, to be expanded to
250,000 barrels per day). Given the level of oil reserves and production pro-
jected in Azerbaijan over.the next three to five years, this should be enough
until (a) oil prices show signs of firming and (b) more oil becomes available.
Current production is edging up toward 100,000 barrels per day this first quar-
ter [of 1999].
Id.
45. See Ivanovich & Durgin, supra note 41, at.2 (slating thatJulia Nanay explained
that shorter pipeline to Supsa was "the best that could have been done, given the com-
mercial circumstances").
46. Id.; see McDonald, supra note 11, at 10 (stating that the oil will be transported
from Caspian to Black Sea ports by Novorossiysk oil pipeline that is almost ready, by
planned Georgian line, and via planned oil terminal in Odessa, Ukraine).
47. See Lowell Bezanis, Report: The Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline: Constraints to a US-backed
Central Asian/Caucasian Exit Route, Petroleum Finance Company, May 1998 (on file with
the Fordham International Law Journal) (examining prospects for construction of Baku-
Ceyhan pipeline and concluding that differing priorities of key Caspian countries make
Baku-Ceyhan pipeline commercially not viable); see also PFC Report, Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline
Is Bad Choice, TuRKISH DAILY NEWS, May 19, 1998, 1998 WL 9591407 (noting that, ac-
cording to, report by Petroleum Finance Company, Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project is cur-
rently not viable).
48. See Bezanis, supra note 47, at 4 (explaining why Turkey promoted Baku-Ceyhan
pipeline project). The project "[olriginates with the initial, hyperactive and implicitly
pan-Turkist phase of Turkey's involvement with the CIS." Id. The Baku-Ceyhan pipe-
line project
became the metaphor for a great geopolitical realignment which the Turks
prematurely declared themselves to be winning. In reality, there was no pros-
pect of Caspian oil volumes to be sufficient enough to fill a main export pipe-
line for more than a decade. And in making such an overt bid, Turkey put
herself on a collision course with Moscow.
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Novorossiysk and Supsa ports and to make the Baku-Ceyhan
pipeline project more attractive.49
B. The Treaty of Montreux
The Treaty of Montreux provides detailed rules for navigat-
ing the Turkish Straits50 and guarantees complete freedom of
passage and navigation of merchant vessels in the Straits. 51 Arti-
cle 7 of the Treaty defines merchant vessels as all vessels other
than warships.5 2 In addition, Article 4 requires pilotage and tow-
age to remain optional and prohibits Turkish authorities from
imposing taxes or other charges on passing vessels.55 The cap-
tains of passing vessels must declare to Turkish officials their ves-
sel's name, nationality, tonnage, destination, and the last visited
port.54 All vessels must stop near the entrance to either strait for
sanitary control,55 after which the vessel may pass through the
Straits without making any more stops throughout its passage.56
49. See id. at 5 (arguing that environmental concerns that Turkey offered asjustifi-
cations for enactment of 1994 Turkish Regulations represented Turkey's "thinly-veiled
trump card"). "Turkey controls a life-line for Black Sea littoral states and can delay
more than just oil-tanker traffic if it so chooses." Id.
50. See Schachte & Bernhardt, supra note 20, at 547 (explaining that, although
Treaty of Montreux regulates passage through Straits, this regulation is less than right
of transit passage and less than right of non-suspendable innocent passage). So far,
however, the United States has not protested any of the provisions of the Treaty of
Montreux. Id.
51. See Treaty of Montreux, supra note 8, art. 2, at 219 (guaranteeing freedom of
navigation in Turkish Straits "in time of peace, by day and night and without any for-
malities for merchant vessels under any flag and with any kind of cargo"). Annex I,
however, provides for charging merchant vessels for maintaining sanitary control sta-
tions, lighthouses, buoys, and life saving devices and guarantees the application of
charges in a non-discriminatory manner. Id. annex I, at 233.
52. Id. art. 7, at 221. In addition, Annex II of the Treaty of Montreux defines
merchant vessel as any surface vessel not exceeding standard displacement of 100 tons,
or displacing more than 100 tons but not functioning in fleet or serving as a troop
transport. Id. annex II, at 235. Merchant vessels are those that do not have such char-
acteristics as: (1) gun caliber greater than 155 mm; (2) more than eight guns with
caliber exceeding 76 mm; (3) capability to launch torpedoes; (4) armor plating protec-
tion; (5) capability of greater than twenty-eight knots speed; or (6) more than two air-
craft-launching apparatus. Id. annex II, at 235.
53. Id. art. 4, at 219.
54. Id. art. 2, at 219.
55. See id. art. 3, at 219 (explaining that sanitary control must be carried out with
all possible speed).
56. See id. (guaranteeing that vessel may not be asked to make any stops through-
out its passage through Straits after stopping at entrance to either strait for sanitary
control).
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The parties57 to the Treaty of Montreux could have
amended the Treaty five years from the day that it entered into
force and, thereafter, at the end of each successive five-year pe-
riod.58 Signatories can modify the Treaty of Montreux at any
time through diplomatic channels or pursuant to a new confer-
ence.59 Any party can terminate the Treaty of Montreux by de-
nouncing the Treaty.6 ° Any denunciation, however, will not af-
fect the principle of free and unhampered transit through the
Straits because Article 28 guarantees that the regime of free
transit will govern indefinitely.61 Although the parties to the
57. See id., art. 3, n. 2, at 215 (identifying U.S.S.R., Great Britain, Australia, Bulga-
ria, France, Greece, Japan, Rumania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia as parties to Treaty of
Montreux).
58. See id. art. 29, at 231 (defining procedure of amendment of Treaty of Mon-
treux by request of any party for revision). All requests for revision stating details and
reasons of proposed amendments must be given to all parties of the Treaty of Montreux
three months before end of current five year period. Id. At least one other signatory
state must support an amendment if it concerns the transit of warships, which Articles
14 and 18 cover. Id. At least two other signatory states must support an amendment if
it concerns all other articles. Id.
59. See id. (providing that, while only three-quarters majority, which includes
three-quarters of Black Sea states parties vote, may amend Articles 14 and 18 of Treaty
of Montreux, the vote must be unanimous to amend all other articles).
60. Id. art. 28, at 229; see Scharfenberg, supra note 30, at 392 (discussing that more
tenable method for Turkey to terminate Treaty of Montreux would be to claim rebus sic
stantibus). Rebus sic stantibus is a mechanism of declaring the significant change in ma-
terial circumstances warranting to ignore the prior treaty. Scharfenberg, supra note 30,
at 392. Turkey has successfully invoked rebus sic stantibus before to dispense of the Lau-
sanne Treaty, the immediate predecessor of the Treaty of Montreux. Id. Scharfenberg
argues that Turkey may invoke rebus sic stantibus because of the change in the size and
number of vessels passing through the Straits since the signing of the Treaty of Mon-
treux in 1936. Id. at 393. Such change was not foreseeable and the absence of heavy
traffic through the Straits may have played a significant role for Turkish acceptance of
the agreement. Id. Now, in light of the changed circumstances, Turkey could argue
that it needs authority to regulate the traffic in the Straits in such way as to ensure safety
and to protect the environment in the Straits. Id.; see Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, art. 62, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan.
27, 1980) (stating in Article 62 of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that to
invoke rebus sic stantibus, party must show three following conditions: (1) fundamental
change of circumstances that was not foreseen by parties when they entered into treaty;
(2) existence of those circumstances was essential basis for parties consent to be bound
by treaty; and (3) effect of change is to transform radically extent of obligations still to
be performed under treaty); see also Scharfenberg, supra note 30, at 381-82 (suggesting
that Treaty of Montreux is "extremely inadequate to deal with specific problems of the
coastal and marine environment").
61. See Treaty of Montreux, supra note 8, art. 28, at 229 (guaranteeing indefinite
regime of free transit through Turkish Straits); see also Scharfenberg, supra note 30, at
355 (explaining that default regime of free transit may be either absolute free passage
or general freedom of navigation limited by needs of Turkey and other Black Sea
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Treaty of Montreux initially intended it to govern for twenty
years, they provided that it will continue to remain in force until
it in formally denounced.6 2 Should any party denounce the
Treaty of Montreux, Article 28 of the Treaty of Montreux re-
quires signatories to agree upon and sign a new treaty that will
regulate navigation in the Turkish Straits. 63
C. The Maritime Traffic Regulation for the Turkish Straits and
Marmara Region
In addition to the Treaty of Montreux rules of passage for
the Turkish Straits, Turkey introduced fifty-nine modifications to
the rules of passage of the Treaty of Montreux in their 1994
Turkish Regulations.64 Turkey explained that these modifica-
tions were vital for maintaining orderly maritime traffic in the
Straits to reduce the likelihood of future accidents.65 The 1994
Turkish Regulations 'apply to all ships navigating the Turkish
states). Scharfenberg concludes that in case of return of the default regime of free
transit in the Turkish Straits, Turkey would be back to the problem of conflicting inter-
pretation of the 1994 Turkish Regulations, similar to those it encountered with reading
the 1994 Turkish Regulations in light of the Treaty of Montreux. Id.
62. Treaty of Montreux, supra note 8, art. 28, at 229.
63. Id.
64. See Bird, supra note 4, at 44 (discussing new transit passage requirements of
1994 Turkish Regulations).
65. See Navigational and Environmental Safety in the Turkish Straits (visited Jan.18,
1999) <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/GRUPF/default.asp?Param@GRUPF/Straitl.HTM> (on
file with the Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafter Safety in the Turkish Straits]
(stressing safety and environmental concerns and providing data on maritime traffic
increase and vessel accidents in Turkish Straits). Dangers of heavy maritime traffic are
as follows:
The nature, volume and frequency of vessel traffic, the increase in the size and
tonnages of the vessels' and the nature of cargoes transported have sharply
increased the risks of maritime accidents which could have grave conse-
quences in terms of ecological, environmental and physical disasters of an un-
precedented nature and scale.
Dense maritime traffic and associated risks and dangers in the straits pose a
serious threat to the physical and environmental security of Istanbul and to
the lives of its 10 million population.
A collision or an environmental disaster will force the closure of the Straits for
unpredictable periods. This force majeure situation will have the practical ef-
fect of denying, impairing and impeding the exercise of the right of naviga-
tion.
Id.; see Bird, supra note 4, at 44 (reporting reasons given by Turkey to explain necessity
of 1994 Turkish Regulations); see also 1994 TURKISH REGULATIONS, supra note 3, art. 1
(defining purpose of 1994 Turkish Regulations). Article 1 states that "It] he purpose of
the Regulations which shall apply to all ships navigating in the Straits and the Sea of
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Straits.66 Under the 1994 Turkish Regulations, the captains .of
all merchant vessels must ensure that their vessels technically
conform to the requirements in Article 6(B) (a)-(m).67 Vessel
captains must also report to the Turkish authorities the vessel's
name, flag, tonnage, port of departure, port of destination, and
any deficiencies of the vessel that may affect the safety of naviga-
68tion.
Part III of the 1994 Turkish Regulations provides the proce-
dure for transit through the Straits.69 This part's key require-
ments for the vessels passing through the Straits include naviga-
tion within the designated traffic lanes,7" a ban of automatic pi-
lot use,7' and the maintenance of a specified speed.72 In order
to navigate through the Straits, Turkish vessels in excess of 150
Marmara is to regulate the maritime traffic scheme in order to ensure the safety of
navigation, life and property and to protect the environment in the region." Id.
66. See 1994 TURKISH REGULATIONS, supra note 3, art. 1 (stating that 1994 Turkish
Regulations "shall apply to all ships navigating in the Straits and the Sea of Marmara").
Id.
67. See id. art. 6 (describing technical requirements for vessel's mechanisms, acces-
sories, and navigational gauges and requiring that "[aill vessels that shall pass through
the Strait of Istanbul and the Strait of Canakkale shall be seaworthy in accordance with
international rules and the legislation of the State whose flag they fly").
68. See id. arts. 7-8 (requiring that information about vessel be given 24 hours
before entrance of Straits from Black Sea region and six hours before departure from
Marmara Sea region). Article 7 requires that: "Sailing Plan I, to be given to Traffic
Control Centre shall contain the following information: name of the vessel, flag of the
vessel, call sign, tonnage, port of departure, port of arrival of cargo, whether pilot is
requested, deficiencies of the vessel which affect navigation adversely, other informa-
tion." Id. art. 7.
Article 8 reads in relevant part that:
Sailing Plan II which shall be given by VHF to the Traffic Control Centre
should contain the following information: name of the vessel, flag of the ves-
sel, call sign, position of the vessel, estimated arrival time to the entrance of
the Strait, whether a pilot is requested, inabilities of the vessel affecting sailing
adversely, other information.
Id. art. 8.
69. See id. arts. 15-28 (regulating speed, overtaking, towing, interruption of transit,
traffic separation schemes, and anchorage while passing Straits).
70. See id. art. 25 (providing for fines to vessels'crossing traffic separation lanes).
Article 25 obligates vessels to navigate "within the designated traffic lanes. Vessels
which cross the lanes may be fined according to Article 11 of Law No. 618 on the Ports,
as well as be brought to the attention of IMO and the flag state." Id.
71. See id. art. 15 (requiring manual control of steering). "The emergency steering
gear will also be kept ready for immediate use with personnel on duty to use it." Id.
72. See id. art. 17 (designating speed as 10 nautical miles per hour). Such speed
can be exceeded for maintaining the steering control of the vessel, or reduced by first
informing the vessels proceeding behind. Id. art. 18.
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meters in length must employ a pilot,73 while foreign vessels are
only advised to take a pilot for safety of navigation. 4 Part III also
gives the Undersecretariat for Maritime Affairs of Turkey75 ("Un-
dersecretariat") the power to stop all maritime traffic in the
Turkish Straits temporarily for construction work, including un-
derwater work, drilling, fire extinguishing, scientific and sports
activities, salvage and rescue operations, prevention of pollution,
pursuit of criminals, and other similar purposes.7 6
The 1994 Turkish Regulations prohibit the discharge of any
pollutants, such as refuse, bilge water, and oil into the Sea of
Marmara or the Turkish Straits.77 Article 42 of the 1994 Turkish
Regulations prohibits large vessels78 carrying hazardous cargo 79
from entering the Straits when another such vessel is in process
73. See id. art. 31 (stating that requirement to employ a pilot is for "safety of naviga-
tion, life, property and the environment"). Article 31 requires:
Turkish vessels 150 metres or more in length passing through the Straits shall
take a pilot for the safety of navigation, life, property and the environment.
Foreign vessels are advised for safety purposes to take a pilot. The Administra-
tion may establish compulsory pilotage requirements in certain areas in the
Straits and Marmara region for vessels other then transiting vessels.
Id.
74. Id.
75. See id. art. 2(a) (empowering Undersecretariat for Maritime Affairs of Turkey
("Undersecretariat") to administer 1994 Turkish Regulations).
76. See id. art. 24 (explaining that Turkish port authority and traffic control sta-
tions will announce closings and openings of Turkish Straits to all vessels). Article 24
requires:
Maritime traffic in the Straits may be temporarily halted by the Administration
due to construction work including underwater work, drilling, fire extinguish-
ing, scientific and sports activities, salvage and rescue operations, prevention
and eradication of maritime pollution; pursuing criminals, accidents and simi-
lar cases. The halting and opening of traffic will be announced by the relevant
port authority and traffic control stations to vessels and persons involved. Af-
ter the reopening of the Straits to traffic following a temporary closure, the
order in which waiting vessels will enter the Straits will be determined by the
traffic control stations and will be announced to the vessels.
Id.
77. See id. art. 33 (banning environmental pollution by vessels). Article 33 re-
quires: "No refuse, landfill, bilge water, domestic and industrial waste, ecologically
harmful or unsanitary material, oil and other pollutants can be dumped or discharged
into the sea in the Straits and Marmara region. Vessels in the Straits and Marmara
region must take every measure not to create air pollution." Id.
78. See id. art. 2(j) (defining "large vessel" as one of 150 meters or more in length).
79. See id. art. 2(h) (defining vessels with "hazardous cargo" as those including
nuclear-powered vessel (except military vessels), vessels carrying petroleum and its de-
rivatives, vessels carrying nuclear, dangerous and noxious wastes as defined in interna-
tional conventions and Turkish legislation).
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of passing through the Straits.s° Article 29 limits the access of
certain types of vessels to the Straits81 by requiring the owner or
manager of a large vessel to provide information about the vessel
to the Undersecretariat at the planning stage of the passage.8 2 It
further provides that the Undersecretariat will inform the owner
or manager of a large vessel of the outcome of its review.8' Arti-
cle 30 of these regulations sets forth a similar procedure for nu-
clear-powered vessels and vessels carrying nuclear, dangerous or
noxious cargo, or waste seeking to obtain permission to pass
through the Straits.84 According to one commentator,85 Articles
29 and 30 imply that Turkey has the discretion to prohibit such
vessels from passing through the Straits.86
D. Relevant Provisions of UNCLOS Regulating Straits Used for
International Navigation
Although UNCLOS currently does not regulate navigation
in the Turkish Straits,87 it does set forth the law of transit passage
through straits used for international navigation,88 or the cus-
tomary international law.89 UNCLOS is the comprehensive,
80. See id. art. 42 (stating that "[w]hen a large vessel with hazardous cargo enters
the Strait, a similar vessel may not enter the Strait until the previous vessel has exited").
81. See id. art. 29 (applying only to "large vessels" defined as those exceeding 150
meters in length).
82. See id. (requiring such information as its cargo, vessel's dimensions, and ma-
neuverability).
83. See id. (stating that Undersecretariat, "taking into consideration the morpho-
logical and physical structure of the Straits, the vessel's dimensions and maneouvre
capability, the safety of life, property and the environment, and maritime traffic condi-
tions, shall inform the applicants of the outcome of its review").
84. See id. art. 30 (requiring vessels carrying dangerous or noxious waste to obtain
permission from Turkish Ministry for Environment in accordance with relevant regula-
tions of Undersecretariat at planning stage of passage).
85. See Scharfenberg, supra note 30, at 355-56 (analyzing meaning of Articles 29
and 30 of 1994 Turkish Regulations).
86. See id. (explaining that text of Articles 29 and 30 of 1994 Turkish Regulations
implicitly empowers Turkey to disallow certain vessels to pass Turkish Straits).
87. See UNCLOS, supra note 21, art. 35(c), at 1276 (providing that UNCLOS does
not affect legal regime in straits regulated by prior international treaty still in force).
88. See id. pt. III, arts. 34-45, at 1276-78 (defining legal status of waters forming
straits used for international navigation and providing rules of passage through such
straits). The United States unequivocal position is that the transit passage provisions of
UNCLOS reflect customary international law. Schachte & Bernhardt, supra note 20, at
537.
89. See Schachte & Bernhardt, supra note 20, at 530-32 (explaining that UNCLOS
codified customary international law of innocent passage and transit passage that ex-
isted prior to UNCLOS). Currently, Articles 19 and 21 of UNCLOS represent the inter-
976 FORDHAM INTERA/ATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 22:961
modern, and internationally-recognized law of the sea.9° It is the
product of the extensive negotiations among experts of mari-
time law.91
Part III of UNCLOS regulates transit passage in straits used
for international navigation. 2 UNCLOS recognizes that one
national law concerning navigation within the coastal states' territorial seas. Id. Article
19(1) of UNCLOS defines meaning of innocent passage as follows: "[p]assage is inno-
cent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal
State. Such passage shall take place in conformity with this Convention and with other
rules of international law." UNCLOS, supra note 21, art. 19, at 1274. Article 21 of
UNCLOS empowers the coastal State to adopt laws and regulations relating to innocent
passage, stating that:
1. The coastal State may adopt laws and regulations, in conformity with the
provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law, relating to
innocent passage through the territorial sea, in respect of all or any of the
following:
(a) the safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic;
(b) the protection of navigational aide and facilities and other facilities or
installations;
(c) the protection of cables and pipelines;
(d) the conservation of the living resources of the sea;
(e) the prevention of infringement of the fisheries laws and regulations of
the coastal State;
(f) the preservation of the environment of the coastal State and the pre-
vention, reduction and control of pollution thereof;
(g) marine scientific research and hydrographic surveys;
(h) the prevention of infringement of the customs, fiscal, immigration or
sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State.
2. Such laws and regulations shall not apply to the design, construction, man-
ning or equipment of foreign ships unless they are giving effect to generally
accepted international rules or standards.
3. The coastal State shall give due publicity to all such laws and regulations.
4. Foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage through the territo-
rial sea shall comply with all such laws and regulations and all generally ac-
cepted international regulations relating to the prevention of collisions at sea.
Id. art. 21, at 1274. Article 44 of UNCLOS sets out the law of transit passage, providing
that it cannot be hampered or suspended by states bordering straits. Id. art. 44, at 1278.
90. See Schachte & Bernhardt, supra note 20, at 527 (explaining that UNCLOS is
contemporary product of work of maritime experts that provides strong framework of
rules to deal with all kinds of complexities and to resolve ambiguities of international
disputes).
91. See id. at 527 (explaining that UNCLOS is comprehensive, responsive, soundly
conceived, and up-to-date body of law for contemporary international maritime rela-
tions). UNCLOS provides the logical framework to ensure resolution of complex fac-
tual situations and offers the analytical tools to resolve difficult navigational disputes
equitably and consistently. Id.
92. See UNCLOS, supra note 21, pt III, arts. 34-45, at 1276-81 (setting out legal
status of waters forming straits used for international navigation, rules of transit pas-
sage, and rules of innocent passage through straits used for international navigation).
Article 44 states that "[s]tates bordering straits shall not hamper transit passage and
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fundamental international commerce and security interest is
open access through international straits.93 Part III of UNCLOS
distinguishes between the regimes of normal straits, 94 the regime
of dead-end straits,95 and the regime of straits governed by prior
international treaties.96 Article 37 defines a normal interna-
tional strait as a strait that connects one part of the high seas,97
or an exclusive economic zone,98 with another." Under Article
44 of UNCLOS, the state bordering a normal strait may not ham-
per or suspend transit passage.1 °°
Article 45(1) (b) and (2) governs navigation in dead-end
straits.01 ' Article 45 (2) prohibits the suspension of innocent pas-
shall give appropriate publicity to any danger to navigation or overflight within or over
the strait of which they have knowledge. There shall be no suspension of transit pas-
sage." Id. art. 44, 21 I.L.M. at 1278.
93. See Schachte & Bernhardt, supra note 20, at 531 (defining rationale behind
transit passage term of UNCLOS). Schachte & Bernhardt state that a regime of the
transit passage is also very important for keeping peace and order: the strait states are
relieved from the role of the "gatekeeper" and thus are less likely to be forced in inter-
national conflicts. Id.
94. See UNCLOS, supra note 21, art. 37, at 1276 (defining "normal" straits as
"straits which are used for international navigation between one part of the high seas or
an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic
zone"); see also Schachte & Bernhardt, supra note 20, at 538-39 (explaining that Strait of
Gibraltar is example of "normal" strait governed by Article 38 of UNCLOS).
95. See Schachte & Bernhardt, supra note 20, at 529 (explaining that dead-end
straits are straits that connect part of high seas or exclusive economic zone and territo-
rial sea of another state).
96. UNCLOS, supra note 21, art. 35(c), at 1276.
97. See id. art. 86, at 1286 (defining high seas as "all parts of the sea that are not
included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters
of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State").
98. See id. art. 55, at 1279 (defining exclusive economic zone as "an area beyond
and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the specific legal regime established in this
Part [V], under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and
freedoms of other States are governed by the relevant provisions of [UNCLOS]").
99. Id. art. 37, at 1276.
100. Id. art. 44, at 1278; see Schachte & Bernhardt, supra note 20, at 540 (explain-
ing that provision prohibiting hampering or stopping transit passage is substantially
greater navigational right than the right of innocent passage under Article 25(3) of
UNCLOS). Under the Article 25(3) right of innocent passage, the strait state can tem-
porarily suspend the innocent passage of foreign vessels if that suspension is essential
for the protection of security of that state. Id.
101. See UNCLOS, supra note 21, art. 45(1)(b), at 1278 (stating that regime of
innocent passage shall apply in straits used for international navigation that connect "a
part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and the territorial sea of a foreign
State").
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sage in such straits. 10 2 Because the regime of innocent passage
that can be suspended under Article 25(3)1 0 is not sufficient for
this type of strait, which can be effectively land-locked, maritime
traffic in the dead-end straits cannot be suspended. °4
Finally, Article 35(c) governs straits that are governed in
whole or in part by prior international treaties. °5 For instance,
the Turkish Straits are regulated by the Treaty of Montreux. 11 6
Consequently, Article 35(c) applies to the Turkish Straits and
recognizes the Treaty of Montreux as the governing regime of
the Turkish Straits.
10 7
Part III of UNCLOS also provides rules of safe passage, in-
cluding the designation of sea lanes and traffic separation
schemes to ensure safe passage through all straits, except the Ar-
ticle 35(c) straits .o8 Article 42 empowers the states bordering
straits to enact rules to further safe navigation and orderly mari-
102. See id. art. 45(2), at 1278 (stating that "[t]here shall be no suspension of inno-
cent passage through such straits").
103. See id. art. 25(3), at 1275 (setting forth rights of protection of coastal state
including temporary suspension of innocent passage). Article 25(3) of UNCLOS reads:
The coastal State may, without discrimination in form or in fact among
foreign ships, suspend temporarily in specified areas of its territorial sea the
innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the protec-
tion of its security, including weapons exercises. Such suspension shall take
effect only after having been duly published.
Id.; see id. art. 19(1), at 1274 (defining meaning of innocent passage as "that is not
prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State"); see also Schachte
& Bernhardt, supra note 20, at 530-32 (defining innocent passage as passage through
coastal state's territorial sea and through straits that are used for international naviga-
tion without entering internal waters, or proceeding to or from internal waters).
104. See Schachte & Bernhardt, supra note 20, at 541 (explaining that right of in-
nocent passage provided in Article 25(3) of UNCLOS is not sufficient to meet interests
of state that is separated by strait from high seas). "Without the right of non-suspend-
able innocent passage, the state at the end of the cul-de-sac would effectively be "land-
locked" with a territorial sea leading nowhere." Id. at 534-35.
105. See UNCLOS, supra note 21, art. 35(c), at 1276 (providing that UNCLOS does
not affect "the legal regime in straits in which passage is regulated in whole or in part by
long-standing international conventions in force specifically relating to such straits").
106. See Schachte & Bernhardt, supra note 20, at 546 (explaining that Danish
Straits, Turkish Straits, Aaland Island Strait, and Strait of Magellan are examples of
Article 35(c) straits).
107. UNCLOS, supra note 21, art. 35(c), at 1276.
108. See id. art. 38, at 1277 (granting all ships and aircraft's right of transit passage
through straits used for international navigation). Article 38 of UNCLOS provides:
1. In straits referred to in article 37, all ships and aircraft enjoy the right
of transit passage, which shall not be impeded; except that, if the strait is
formed by an island of a State bordering the strait and its mainland, transit
passage shall not apply if there exists seaward of the island a route through the
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time traffic, prevention and reduction of pollution, enforcement
of sanitary laws, customs, and immigration regulations of the
coastal state. 10 9 All vessels passing through the straits must fol-
low these rules. 110
To enable states to adopt these maritime rules, UNCLOS
was open for signature by all states"' from December 10, 1982 to
December 9, 1984.112 Further, UNCLOS was subject to ratifica-
tion by its signatories." 3 For all other states, UNCLOS remains
high seas or through an exclusive economic zone of similar convenience with
respect to navigational and hydrographical characteristics.
2. Transit passage means the exercise in accordance with this Part of the
freedom of navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and
expeditious transit of the strait between one part of the high seas or an exclu-
sive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive eco-
nomic zone. However, the requirement of continuous and expeditious transit
does not preclude passage through the strait for the purpose of entering, leav-
ing or returning from a State bordering the strait, subject to the conditions of
entry to that State.
Id. art. 38(1), (2), at 1277.
109. See id. art. 42(1), at 1277 (providing that states bordering straits may adopt
laws and regulations relating to transit passage through straits). Such laws and regula-
tions may be adopted in respect of all or any of the following:
(a) the safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic, as pro-
vided in article 41;
(b) the prevention, reduction and control of pollution, by giving effect to
applicable international regulations regarding the discharge of oil, oily wastes
and other noxious substances in the strait;
(c) with respect to fishing vessels, the prevention of fishing, including the
stowage of fishing gear;
(d) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person in
contravention of the custom, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regula-
tions of States bordering straits.
Id.
110. Id. art. 42(4), at 1278.
111. See id. art. 305 (1) (a), at 1326 (providing that UNCLOS is open for signature
by all states).
112. See id. art. 305(2), at 1326 (providing that UNCLOS "shall remain open for
signature until 9 December 1984 at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Jamaica and also,
from 1 July 1983 until 9 December 1984, at United Nations Headquarters in New
York.").
113. See id. art. 306, 21 I.L.M. at 1326 (setting out procedures of ratification and
formal confirmation of UNCLOS). Article 306 provides:
This Convention is subject to ratification by States and the other entities
referred to in article 305, paragraph l(b), (c), (d) and (e), and to formal
confirmation, in accordance with Annex IX, by the entities referred to in arti-
cle 305, paragraph 1 (f). The instruments of ratification and of formal confir-
mation shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
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open for accession in accordance with Article 307.114 Once in
force, UNCLOS does not alter the rights and obligations of sig-
natories in relation to other conventions and international
agreements that are compatible with the convention. 115
As to the states bordering the Black Sea ("Black Sea states"),
the Russian Federation, Bulgaria, and Romania have signed and
later ratified UNCLOS. 116 Georgia has not signed UNCLOS but
adopted it by accession.1 17 The Ukraine has signed, but has
neither ratified nor acceded to UNCLOS." 8 Turkey is the only
114. See id. art. 307, at 1326 (providing for accession where instruments of acces-
sion shall be deposited with Secretary-General of United Nations). UNCLOS "shall
enter into force 12 months after the date of deposit of the sixtieth instrument of ratifi-
cation or accession." Id. art. 308(1), at 1327. After the deposit of the sixtieth instru-
ment of ratification or accession, for each state ratifying or acceding to UNCLOS, it
"shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the deposit of its instrument of
ratification or accession." Id. art. 308(2), at 1327.
115. See id. art. 311(2), (3), at 1327 (setting out rights of parties in relation to
other conventions and international agreements that are compatible with UNCLOS).
Article 311(2), (3) states:
2. This Convention shall not alter the rights and obligations of States Par-
ties which arise from other agreement's compatible with this Convention and
which do not affect the enjoyment by other States Parties of their rights or the
performance of their obligations under this Convention.
3. Two or more States Parties may conclude agreements modifying or sus-
pending the operation of provisions of this Convention, applicable solely to
the relations between them, provided that such agreements do not relate to a
provision derogation from which is incompatible with the effective execution
of the object and purpose of this Convention, and provided further that such
agreements shall not affect the application of the basic principles embodied
herein, and that the provisions of such agreements do not affect the enjoy-
ment by other States Parties of their rights or the performance of their obliga-
tions under this Convention.
Id. art. 311(2), (3), at 1327. Article 310 authorizes the parties to make the following
declarations:
Article 309 does not preclude a State, when signing, ratifying or acceding
to this Convention, from making declarations or statements, however phrased
or named, with a view, inter alia, to the harmonization of its laws and regula-
tions with the provisions of this Convention, provided that such declarations
or statements do not purport to exclude or to modify the legal effect of the
provisions of this Convention in their application to that State.
Id. art. 310, at 1327.
116. See MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL, supra
note 22, at 799-801 (reporting that Russian Federation ratified UNCLOS on March 12,
1997, Bulgaria ratified UNCLOS on May 15, 1996, and Romania ratified UNCLOS on
December 17, 1996).
117. See id. at 800 (reporting that Georgia adopted UNCLOS by accession on
March 21, 1996).
118. Id. at 801.
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Black Sea state that has neither signed nor adopted UNCLOS.119
Part XV of UNCLOS sets out the dispute resolution proce-
dure for parties to UNCLOS 2 ° Section 1 of Part XV requires
the parties in disputes concerning the interpretation or applica-
tion of the convention to make an effort to settle by peaceful
means of their own choice. 121 The parties may also submit their
dispute to conciliation.1 22 In addition, any party to a dispute can
119. See id. at 799-801 (listing all nations that signed UNCLOS, signed and ratified
UNCLOS, signed and acceded to UNCLOS, and did not sign but acceded or succeeded
to UNCLOS; nations that have neither signed nor acceded to UNCLOS are not listed).
120. See UNCLOS, supra note 21, pt. XV, arts. 279-99, at 1322-25 (setting out pro-
cedure of dispute settlement, and defining jurisdiction and applicable law of dispute
settlement procedures).
121. See id. pt. XV, § 1, arts. 279-85, at 1322-22 (setting out procedure of dispute
resolution prior to submission of dispute to court for binding decision). Article 279
sets out an obligation of the parties to "settle any dispute between them concerning the
interpretation or application of this Convention by peaceful means." Id. art. 279, at
1322. Article 280 provides that UNCLOS does not impair "the right of any States Par-
ties to agree at any time to settle a dispute between them concerning the interpretation
or application of this Convention by any peaceful means of their own choice." Id. art.
280, at 1322. If states have obligations under general, regional or bilateral agreements
to submit, at the request of any party to the dispute, "to a procedure that entails a
binding decision, that procedure shall apply in lieu of the procedures provided for in
this Part, unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree." Id. art. 282, at 1322. Article
283 obliges the parties to exchange their views.
1. When a dispute arises between States Parties concerning the interpre-
tation or application of this Convention, the parties to the dispute shall pro-
ceed expeditiously to an exchange of views regarding its settlement by negotia-
tion or other peaceful means.
2. The parties shall also proceed expeditiously to an exchange of views
where a procedure for the settlement of such a dispute has been terminated
without a settlement or where a settlement has been reached and the circum-
stances require consultation regarding the manner of implementing the settle-
ment.
Id. art. 283, at 1322.
122. See id. art. 284, at 1322 (providing that "a party to a dispute concerning the
interpretation or application of this Convention may invite the other party or parties to
submit the dispute to conciliation in accordance with the procedure under Annex V,
Section 1, or another conciliation procedure"). Article 284 further provides:
2. If the invitation is accepted and if the parties agree upon the concilia-
tion procedure to be applied, any party may submit the dispute to that proce-
dure.
3. If the invitation is not accepted or the parties do not agree upon the
procedure, the conciliation proceedings shall be deemed to be terminated.
4. Unless the parties otherwise agree, when a dispute has been submitted
to conciliation, the proceedings may be terminated only in accordance with
the agreed conciliation procedure.
Id. art. 284(2)-(4), at 1322.
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seek binding decision1 2  by the court that has jurisdiction 124
under Section 2 of Part XV1 25 of UNCLOS if the parties fail to
settle their dispute by the means provided in Section 1 of Part
XV.1 26 The International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea, a per-
manent institution established by and linked to UNCLOS, re-
solves disputes concerning the application and interpretation of
UNCLOS provisions.1 27 In addition to the International Tribu-
123. See id. art. 296, at 1324 (stating that "[a]ny decision rendered by a court or
tribunal having jurisdiction under this section shall be final and shall be complied with
by all the parties to the dispute" and that "[a]ny such decision shall have no binding
force except between the parties and in respect of that particular dispute").
124. See id. art. 288, at 1323 (conferring jurisdiction to courts or tribunal referred
to in Article 287 (International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, International Court of
Justice, arbitral tribunal, or special arbitral tribunal) "over any dispute concerning the
interpretation or application of this Convention which is submitted to it in accordance
with this Part"). In addition, Article 288 provides: "A court or tribunal referred to in
article 287 shall also have jurisdiction over any dispute concerning the interpretation or
application of an international agreement related to the purposes of this Convention,
which is submitted to it in accordance with the agreement." Id. art. 288(2), at 1323. "In
the event of a dispute as to whether a court or tribunal has jurisdiction, the matter shall
be settled by decision of that court or tribunal." Id. art. 288(4), at 1323. Applicable law
for such binding dispute resolution proceedings is defined in Article 293: "A court or
tribunal having jurisdiction under this section shall apply this Convention and other
rules of international law not incompatible with this Convention." Id. art. 293, 21
I.L.M. at 1324.
125. See id. pt. XV, § 2, arts. 286-96, at 1322-24 (providing compulsory procedures
entailing binding decisions).
126. See id. art. 286, at 1322 (providing that "any dispute concerning the interpre-
tation or application of this Convention shall, where no settlement has been reached by
recourse to section 1, be submitted at the request of any party to the dispute to the
court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section").
127. See id. art. 287(1), at 1322 (providing parties in dispute with choice of means
for the settlement of disputes). Article 287(1) states:
When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention or at any time
thereafter, a State shall be free to choose, by means of a written declaration,
one or more of the following means for the settlement of disputes concerning
the interpretation or application of this Convention:
(a) the international Tribunal for the Law of the Sea established in ac-
cordance with Annex VI;
(b) the International Court of Justice;
(c) an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII;
(d) a special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VIII
for one or more of the categories of disputes specified therein.
Id. art. 287 (1), at 1322; see Statement of the Panel on the Law of Ocean Uses, Under the Chair-
manship of Louis Henkin, adopted a statement on U.S. Policy on the Settlement of Disputes in the
Law of the Sea, 81 Am. J. INr'L L. 438, 441 (1987) [hereinafter Statement of the Panel]
(discussing UNCLOS dispute resolution mechanism and expressing opinion that UN-
CLOS provides highly flexible means of dispute resolution). Article 297(1) (a) explains
that "[d]isputes concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention with
regard to the exercise by a coastal State of its sovereign rights orjurisdiction provided
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nal on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS provides the parties with
options including arbitration and the International Court of Jus-
tice. 1 2
8
II. REVIEW OF THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN SEVERAL
COUNTRIES OVER THE 1994 TURKISH REGULATIONS"
When Turkey enacted the 1994 Turkish Regulations,
Greece, Russia, and several other states that depend on the
Turkish Straits for shipping to and from Black Sea ports129 ob-
jected. 130 These countries claimed that the 1994 Turkish Regu-
lations violated the Treaty of Montreux's grant of free commer-
cial vessel transit through the Straits.13 ' They maintained that
Turkey had introduced the 1994 Turkish Regulations to block
an increase in oil tanker traffic and to lobby for construction of
for in this Convention shall be subject to the procedures provided for in section 2"
when it is claimed that "a coastal State has acted in contravention of the provisions of
this Convention in regard to the freedom and rights of navigation . UNCLOS,
supra note 21, art. 297(1)(a), at 1324.
128. UNCLOS, supra note 21, art. 287(1) (b)-(c), at 1322; see Statement of the Panel,
supra note 127, at 441 (explaining that UNCLOS's mechanism of dispute resolution is
beneficial to the parties to UNCLOS). The UNCLOS's compulsory and binding system
of settlement of disputes is beneficial for the following reasons:
The accommodations between coastal and maritime interests regarding
navigation, overflight and environmental protection, reflected in various pro-
visions of the Convention, will be subject to continuing pressures. Sometimes
there will be confrontation; sometimes there will be acquiescence, as states
grow reluctant to expend political, economic or military capital to protect
their interests and the balance achieved in the Convention from corrosive
precedents. A compulsory and binding system of third-party settlement of dis-
putes provides a "third option." Such an arrangement will induce greater self-
restraint, encourage officials to seek legal advice before acting, and will impel
lawyers to be cautious in their advice. Dispute settlement arrangements also
provide a state that has acted in violation of the rules with a graceful retreat: it
need not yield to pressure from another state, only to the rule of law as em-
bodied in the binding judgment of a disinterested tribunal. A dispute settle-
ment arrangement permits a state confident that it is acting within its rights to
seek judgment confirming and vindicating its actions.
Statement of the Panel, supra note 127, at 440-41.
129. See Bird, supra note 4, at 44 (naming nations that depend on Black Sea ship-
ping); see also Janet Porter, Russia and Turkey Continue Battle over Legality of Bosporus
Rules, J. COM., Mar. 20, 1995, at IB (explaining that Turkish Straits are "the only water
link to the open seas for countries around the Black Sea such as Russia, Romania, Bul-
garia and Ukraine").
130. See Bird, supra note 4, at 44 (noting that Russia was especially sensitive to
Turkey's implementation of 1994 Turkish Regulations).
131. See Safety Rules Revamp for Turkish Straits, supra note 9, at 3 (commenting on
Russia's objection to 1994 Turkish Regulations as infringement of Treaty of Montreux).
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an oil pipeline through Turkey' 1 2 that would replace tankers
and bring oil from the Caspian oil shelf through Turkey to lucra-
tive Western markets. 3' In opposition to these accusations, Tur-
key claimed that it established the 1994 Turkish Regulations
solely for the purposes of facilitating navigational safety and envi-
ronmental protection.1 34 Turkey maintained that it did not in-
tend to affect or to prejudice the rights of the ships using the
Turkish Straits under theTreaty of Montreux. 135
The international dispute between Turkey and Russia over
the legality of the 1994 Turkish Regulation remains un-
resolved.'3 6 While Turkey claims to pursue safety of navigation
and environmental concerns, Russia accuses Turkey of attempt-
ing to obtain oil money and more power in the region by mak-
ing all of the surrounding states dependent on Turkey for mari-
time shipping through the Straits. 137 Commentators conclude
that the confrontation between two sides will decide Europe's
access to the enormous estimated oil reserves that could gener-
ate up to US$100 billion of revenues over the next thirty years.'13
132. See Jonathan Ewing, Tangled Straits, J. COM., Sept. 6, 1996, at IA (explaining
that Russia, one of most frequent users of Turkish Straits, accused Turkey of using 1994
Turkish Regulations to limit traffic through Turkish Starits in order to advance its case
for Baku-Ceyhan pipeline). Leonid Manjosin, consul general of the Russian Federation
in Istanbul, stated: "We are very sympathetic to the Turkish concern for the safety of
their tankers and for the safety of the millions of residents living on the shore of the
straits of Istanbul. Still, their problem is domestic and they can't be allowed to violate
international law." Id.
133. See id. (reporting on Russia's claim that Turkey stands to gain more economi-
cally from this pipeline with much less ecological risk).
134. See Bird, supra note 4, at 44 (quoting Resat Ozkan, former Turkish Undersec-
retary for Maritime Affairs, who stated: "We want a safer environment in the Turkish
Straits, to ensure the health of the ecosystem and the historical heritage of the region").
135. See Akbay, supra note 11, at *3 (noting that Turkish Undersecretary for Mari-
time Affairs Resat Ozkan stated that 1994 Turkish Regulations "are not a political deci-
sion and they certainly do not violate the Montreux convention, as some people
claim"); see also Scharfenberg, supra note 30, at 360 (noting that, while Turkey has al-
ways maintained that it is not violating Treaty of Montreux, Turkey has contradicted
itself when Turkey admitted that it is challenging the Treaty by claiming that control
over the Turkish Straits is within Turkey's internal jurisdiction).
136. See George, supra note 13, at 8 (describing rising tensions between parties to
controversy over Turkish Straits).
137. Id.
138. See Land, supra note 12, at *5 (explaining that confrontation is over share of
economic and political advantage to be gained from traffic of enormous oil reserves of
Caspian Region).
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A. Position of the Republic of Turkey as to the Appropriateness of the
1994 Turkish Regulations
Turkey asserts that it has legitimate and increasingly impor-
tant reasons to take a strong position regarding the 1994 Turkish
Regulations.139 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey140 ar-
gues that the increasing size and number of ships passing
through the Straits raises the risk of accidents. 1 41 In support of
this argument, Turkey recalls that the International Maritime
Organization142 ("IMO") warned in 1994: of an increased poten-
tial risk of heavy maritime traffic in the Turkish Straits. 43 The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey also points out that the
Straits are severely overloaded by heavy traffic. 4 Each year,
45,000 large vessels use the Straits,145 and an additional 1,000
local vessels cross the Straits daily.14 6 The health and lives of
139. See Background Note, supra note 27 (explaining that present situation of heavy
maritime traffic through Turkish Straits compels tighter regulation of navigation in
Turkish Straits).
140. See Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Structure and Organization (visited Jan. 18,
1999) <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/GRUPF/default.asp?Param@GRUPF/Table.HTM> (on
file with the Fordham International LawJoisrnal) (describing Turkish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs structure and organization); see also The Goals and Principles of Turkish Foreign
Policy (visited Jan. 18, 1999) <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/GRUPF/default.asp?Param
@GRUPF/princip.htm> (on file with the Fordham International LawJournal) (providing
Turkish Ministry's of Foreign Affairs official statement identifying principles and goals
of Turkish foreign policy).
141. See Background Note, supra note 27 (illustrating substantial increase of vessel
accidents in Turkish Straits).
142. See 6 THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 6, at 351 (noting that
International Maritime Organization ("IMO"), formerly (1948-1982) Inter-Governmen-
tal Maritime Consultative Organization, is specialized agency created by United Nations
as instrumentality for cooperation in establishing technical regulations and practices in
international shipping, encouraging adoption of highest standards for maritime safety
and navigation, and discouraging discriminatory and restrictive practices in interna-
tional trade and unfair practices by shipping concerns). The IMO was established in
1948 by an international convention prepared by the United Nations Maritime Confer-
ence. Id. The first assembly was held in January 1959. Id. "The Assembly is the policy-
making body that meets every two years; the Council, consisting of 24 member states,
meets twice a year and is responsible for governing between Assembly sessions." Id.
143. See The Bosphorus: A Waterway at Risk (visited Jan. 18, 1999) <http://
www.mfa.gov.tr/GRUPF/default.asp?Param@grupf/caspian3.htm> (on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal) (explaining that IMO's warning about safety in Turk-
ish Straits was issued because Straits are "one of the busiest, overloaded trading routes
in the world").
144. See id. (explaining that traffic overload not only threatens safety of navigation
in Turkish Straits, but also affects residents of Istanbul).
145. Id.
146. Id.
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twelve million Istanbul residents are in potential danger from
any disaster in the Straits involving fire, explosion, or toxic mate-
rial emission.1 47 Turkey also justifies the 1994 Turkish Regula-
tions by stressing that heavy maritime traffic endangers the Black
Sea's ecosystem.
148
Turkey has taken the position that the Straits cannot be-
come an oil transportation route 49 and has threatened not to let
oil tankers pass through the Straits.' 50 The powerful lobby of
147. See id. (noting that tanker "Nassia" disaster in 1994 "would have been major
urban disaster if it had been a few miles to the south."). The high risk of collision is
present because these nineteen mile channels are very narrow, with twelve abrupt angu-
lar windings and four totally blind curves that are less than half a mile wide at one point
in the Straits. The Dangers of the Bosphorus (visited Jan. 18, 1999) <http://
www.mfa.gov.tr/GRUPF/default.asp?Param@grupf/caspian4.htm> (on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal). Two ships coming from opposite directions often
cannot see each other. Id. In addition, there are powerful and rapid currents, variable
counter currents, and submerged eddies which are capable of dragging vessels off
course and off anchor. Id. The high risk of collision is also heightened by the substan-
tial growth of traffic in the Straits. Id. Since 1960, the number of foreign ships passing
through the Straits has risen by over 150%. Id. Vessels are also getting larger, and
tonnage has increased by over 400%. Id.
148. See The Bosphorus: A Waterway at Risk, supra note 143 (explaining that Turkish
Straits are "a biological corridor for all marine wildlife traveling in and out of Black
Sea" and that shipping pollution has prevented regular migrations of marine wildlife
and decreased fishing levels). "Increased levels of pollution threaten endangered spe-
cies such as the Monachus monachus (monk seal) and the Ziphius cavirostris (Bottle-nosed
dolphin)." Id. All ships contribute to pollution by regularly leaking oil, but the greatest
fear is the risk of potential collisions of oil tankers, which could release thousands of
tons of oil into the sea. Id.
149. See Background Note, supra note 27 (stating that "due to the nature of the
Straits and the existing grave situation created by dense traffic congestion, the Turkish
Straits cannot be considered as an oil transportation route"). "The Straits cannot carry
the additional burden which will be brought by large amounts of oil shipments." Id.
150. See George, supra note 13, at 8 (predicting that Turkish Straits issue "may
prove to be a flashpoint between two countries in the not so distant future"). One
Turkish official stated: "We will not, however, let the Russians move the oil through the
Straits. They may as well drink it for all we care." Id. Turkish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs stated:
This unbearable burden cannot be tolerated without endangering the city
of Istanbul itself, its population of 10 million, its unique historical heritage
and the precarious environment.
Given that alternative projects such as the building of oil pipelines over
Turkish territory to the Mediterranean Sea are economically and technically
feasible, environmentally much safer, and more secure and logical in every
sense, then, relying on the Straits to be a mock "oil pipeline" for the large-
scale transportation of crude oil and other dangerous cargo appears ill-ad-
vised, and a self-defeating notion in the long run. It is not a viable and practi-
cal option for crude exports.
Background Note, supra note 27.
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Turkish industrial and environmental groups and the Turkish
Chamber of Shipping 151 (the "Lobby") reinforced this threat by
stating that it will do more than just issue declarations, asking
the government and international organizations to act, and hint-
ing that it may block the waterway to press its demands.1 52 The
Lobby demands significant restrictions on traffic through the
Bosporus, such as restrictions on the size of vessels allowed to
transit the Straits.1 53 In addition, the Lobby demands a gradual
decrease in the amount of hazardous materials carried through
the Straits, including banning tankers with a load capacity above
20,000 tons and a length of more than 150 meters.
154
One commentator 155 analyzed Turkey's justification for its
unilateral action of imposing the 1994 Turkish Regulations,
1 56
arguing that the 1994 Turkish Regulations are legitimate and
should not be interpreted as impeding navigation in violation of
the Treaty of Montreux because the heavy increase of maritime
traffic has created a danger of collisions and pollution. 57 The
commentator concludes that the 1994 Turkish Regulations are a
reasonable effort to prevent collisions and to ensure orderly nav-
igation in the Turkish Straits, which is fundamentally consistent
with the provisions of the Treaty of Montreux.158 Furthermore,
the commentator analyzed several alternative actions that Tur-
key could take if it continues to enforce the 1994 Turkish Regu-
lations and no longer attempts to work within the framework of
the Treaty of Montreux.159 Turkey may influence maritime in-
151. See Turkish Lobby Demands Limits on Traffic, Hazardous Loads Carried Through
Bosporus, INT'L ENV'T REP., June 11, 1997, at 585 (describing role of Turkish environ-
mental lobby ("Lobby") in Turkish Straits traffic regulation).




155. Scharfenberg, supra note 30, at 333.
156. See id. at 395 (maintaining that, although 1994 Turkish Regulations "have
aroused a great deal of opposition from other states, .... they are Turkey's best hope for
mitigating dangers in the Straits").
157. See id. (arguing that "free passage through the Straits does not mean unregu-
lated passage").
158. See id. (contending that Treaty of Montreux implicitly authorizes Turkey to
implement unilateral regulatory scheme for Turkish Straits).
159. See id. at 388-94 (exploring Turkey's options of dealing with current situation
in Turkish Straits if Russia and other nations continue challenging 1994 Turkish Regu-
lations, and examining possible legal regimes that could apply if Turkey decided to
terminate the Treaty of Montreux). The possible legal regimes of the Turkish Straits
1999]
988 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 22:961
surance companies to make the use of a pilot for transit through
the Straits a precondition for insurance coverage.16 ° Turkey can
also encourage its shipping companies to reduce vessel crowding
and pollution by entering into bilateral agreements. 161 The
commentator further argues that a superior alternative for Tur-
key would be to attempt to renegotiate the Treaty of Montreux
at a conference convened by the original parties to the Treaty
and all third parties interested in the Turkish Straits. 162 The
commentator concedes, however, that Turkey may have reasons
not to do so' 6 ' in order to affirm its control over the Turkish
Straits navigation."'
B. Position of the Parties Challenging the 1994 Turkish Regulations
Russia, Greece, Bulgaria, and other nations that depend on
Black Sea shipping challenge the 1994 Turkish Regulations be-
cause they affect the interests of these nations.'65 The traffic in
the Turkish Straits delays deliveries and inflicts million-dollar
losses and high price increases on shippers.'6 6 Russia complains
after termination of the Treaty of Montreux may be the custom of navigation as it be-
came customary during the years governed by the Treaty of Montreux or a new treaty if
Turkey attempts to re-negotiate Treaty of Montreux. Id. at 389-90, 393-94.
160. See id. at 395 (describing possible "private sector solution" of placing pressure
on maritime insurers to require employment of pilot for transit through Turkish Straits
as precondition for insurance coverage).
161. See id. at 394 (explaining that similar approaches have been undertaken by
ship owners in Greece and Turkey with moderate success). Such actions may be "par-
tial solutions to a problem rooted in an out-of-date strait regime," but would not elimi-
nate the problems in the Turkish Straits. Id.
162. See id. at 393-94 (explaining that Turkey may request new conference to re-
negotiate Treaty of Montreux). The benefit of such action would be that a new Turkish
Straits discussion would decrease the international tension and confusion caused by the
out-dated Treaty of Montreux. Id. at 394.
163. See id. at 394 (analyzing possible Turkish interest to avoid re-negotiation of
Treaty of Montreux because none of parties to the Treaty of Montreux called for a new
convention).
164. See id. (arguing that limited interference from other states "is the best way to
maintain tight control over navigation policy in the Straits").
165. See Bird, supra note 4, at 44 (discussing negative impact of 1994 Turkish Regu-
lations on interests of Greece, Russia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Ukraine in shipping
through Turkish Straits).
166. See id. (noting that Black Sea dependent shipowners of Greece, Russia,
Romania, Bulgaria, and Ukraine are affected by delays in Turkish Straits, causing multi-
million U.S. dollar losses); see also Geoff Winestock, IMO Vote on Turkish Straits Safety Seen
Differently in Moscow, Ankara, J. COM., Dec. 28, 1995, at 6B (reporting claim of Mikhail
Demurin, a Russian foreign-affairs spokesman, that 1994 Turkish Regulations resulted
in delays that cost Russian shipowners over one million U.S. dollars). The Novorossisk
1999] REGULATION OF THE TURKISH STRAITS
that Turkey unreasonably causes hundreds of Russian vessels to
wait at the entrance to the Straits for lengthy periods of time,
thereby causing significant economic damage to the shipown-
ers. 167 For example, Novorossiysk Shipping Co. claimed that it
had lost more than US$1 million in the second half of 1995
while its vessels waited for permission from the Turkish authori-
ties to enter the Straits. 168
Since the introduction of the 1994 Turkish Regulations,
Russia has maintained that the 1994 Turkish Regulations do not
comply with the Treaty of Montreux or the IMO's Rules and
Recommendations on Navigation Through the Strait of Istanbul,
the Strait of Canakkale and Marmara ("IMO Rules and Recom-
mendations"),69 For instance, Russia firmly holds on to the po-
sition that Articles 40, 41, 50, and 51 of the 1994 Turkish Regula-
tions, which restrict maritime traffic during poor visibility and
unsatisfactory currents,17 ° contradict the Treaty of Montreux
Shipping Co., one of the world's biggest tanker fleets, complained that Turkish port
authorities did not explain what caused delays and "applied traffic rules in an inconsis-
tent and incomprehensible way." Id. at 6B. The company further claimed that its ves-
sels are disadvantaged "by a system that reduces delays for ships that take on expensive
Turkish pilots, even though Russian captains have equal experience in the waters of the
straits." Id. Nikolai Slavov, chairman of the Black Sea Shipowners Association, Ukraine,
explained that delays caused by the 1994 Turkish Regulations are shared by shipowners
of his membership, and that companies with larger tankers were most affected. Id.
Slavov further stated that the 1994 Turkish Regulations resulted in one-way traffic for
bigger vessels, the system that "would be unnecessary if Turkey introduced modern
traffic-control systems and rules." Id.
167. See Land, supra note 12, at *5 (explaining that hundreds of Russian vessels
must wait for thousands of hours before they can pass through Straits, suffering signifi-
cant economic damage in lost contracts and commercial advantages).
168. See Porter, supra note 129, at 1B (quoting Gennadiy Fedchenko, vice presi-
dent of Novorossisk Shipping Co.).
169. Rules and Recommendations on Navigation Through the Strait of Istanbul, the Strait
of Canakkale and Marmara Sea, Maritime Safety Council of the IMO, Sess. 63, June 15,
1994 (visited Nov. 15, 1998) <http://inter.mfa.gov.tr:80/grupf/navigate.htm> (on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafter IMO Rules and Recommenda-
tions]; see Schweikart, supra note 19, at 47 (stating that Turkey, in protecting its interests
in Turkish Straits, acted unilaterally, in contravention of Rules and Recommendations on
Navigation Through the Strait of Istanbul ("IMO Rules and Recommendations")).
170. See 1994 TuluosH REGULATIONS, supra note 3, arts. 40, 41, 50, and 51 (requir-
ing large vessels with dangerous cargoes to wait until poor visibility and unsatisfactory
currents have stopped). Article 40 of 1994 Turkish Regulations states in relevant part:
a) When the main surface current speed in the Strait of Istanbul exceeds 4
NM/hr or when northerly surface currents are caused by southerly winds,
then, large vessels, deep draught vessels and hazardous cargo carrying vessels
with a speed of 10 NM/hr or less will not enter the Straits and will wait until
current speeds are 4 NM/hr or less.
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and UNCLOS1 7 1 because Article 44 of UNCLOS prohibits sus-
pension of transit passage 17 2 and Article 42(2) prohibits states
bordering the Straits to administer their law and regulations in
such a way as to affect or deny free transit passage.'73 In addi-
tion, Russia claims that Article 25 of the 1994 Turkish Regula-
tions, which imposes penalties on vessels that cross the desig-
nated traffic lanes,1 74 contradicts IMO Rules 1.2 and 1.3175 that
When the main surface current in the Strait exceeds 6 NM/hr or when
strong northerly flows are caused by southerly winds, then large vessels, deep
draught vessels and hazardous cargo carrying vessels-whatever their speed-
will not enter the Strait and will wait until current speeds are less than 6 NM/
hr, or the strong northerly flows have stopped.
Id. art. 40. Article 41 provides for the following limitations in the Strait of Bosporus
during poor visibility:
Whenever visibility is 2 NM or less in any part of the Strait, vessels passing
through the Strait will keep their radar turned on constantly to provide radar
readings. On vessels with two radars, one of them will be assigned to the pi-
lot's usage.
When visibility is 1.5 NM or less in any part of the Strait, vessels whose
radar does not provide a complete display ability shall not enter the Strait.
When visibility in the Strait is 1 NM or less, vessels carrying hazardous
cargo and large vessels shall not enter into the Straits.
When visibility in any part of the Straits is 0.5 NM, maritime traffic shall
be open in the appropriate direction and closed in the opposite. In such situ-
ations only vessels less than 100 meters in length and which do not carry haz-
ardous cargo can navigate in the direction open to traffic.
When visibility in any part of the Strait is less than 0.5 NM, the traffic flow
in the Strait shall be closed in both directions.
When visibility in the Strait is suitable for navigation, the arrangement
and order of entering the Strait shall be determined and notified to the wait-
ing vessels and persons concerned by the Traffic Control Centre.
Id. art. 41. Article 50 imposes analogous to Article 40 limitations on vessels in the Strait
of Dardanelles during unfavorable currents. Id. art. 50. Article 51 imposes analogous
to Article 41 limitations on vessels in the Strait of Dardanelles during poor visibility. Id.
art. 51.
171. See Schweikart, supra note 19, at 46-47 (providing overview of Russia's claims
of non-compliance of 1994 Turkish Regulations to international law, Treaty of Mon-
treux, and IMO Rules and Recommendations).
172. See UNCLOS, supra note 21, art. 44, at 1278 (defining duties of states border-
ing straits). Article 44 of UNCLOS provides that "there shall be no suspension of
transit passage." Id. Article 24 of 1994 Turkish Regulations authorizes Turkey to close
the Straits temporarily for maintenance purposes. 1994 TURKISH REGULATIONS, supra
note 3, art. 24.
173. See UNCLOS, supra note 21, art. 42(2), at 1277 (providing that application of
law and regulations of states bordering straits shall not have "practical effect of denying,
hampering, or impairing the right of transit passage").
174. See 1994 TURKISH REGULATIONS, supra note 3, art. 25 (providing that "[v]essels
must proceed within the designated traffic lanes. Vessels which cross the lanes may be
fined").
175. See IMO's Rules and Recommendations, supra note 169, rule 1.2 (providing for
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address circumstances where a vessel is unable to comply with
the traffic separation schemes and authorize temporary suspen-
sion of traffic separation schemes and two way traffic. 1 7 6
C. Position of the International Maritime Organization Concerning
the Appropriateness of the 1994 Turkish Regulations
The IMO assumed responsibility for working out maritime
regulations of shipping in the Turkish Straits that would satisfy
the changed conditions. 1 77 In May 1994, the IMO's Maritime
Safety Committee 178 met to discuss the 1994 Turkish Regula-
tions. 17 At this meeting, all Black Sea states, which are members
of the IMO, as well as Greece and Cyprus, accused Turkey of
violating the Treaty of Montreux 80 The Maritime Safety Com-
mittee discussed proposed amendments and modifications to
the 1994 Turkish Regulations and recommended less restrictive
rules of passage through the Turkish Straits.' The Maritime
Safety Committee requested that Turkey follow these recom-
mendations. 82
On the basis of the Maritime Safety Committee's findings,
the IMO issued the IMO Rules and Recommendations. 8 ' The
IMO Rules and Recommendations differ from the 1994 Turkish
temporary suspension of traffic separation schemes); see also id. rule 1.3 (providing for
temporary suspension of two way traffic).
176. IMO's Rules and Recommendations, supra note 169, rules 1.2-1.3.
177. See id. at 30 (stressing importance of having peaceful process of working out
compromise solution between parties to dispute over free transit through Turkish
Straits).
178. See 6 THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BITANNICA, supra note 6, at 351 (discussing
Maritime Safety Committee function of reviewing safety proposals on its annual meet-
ings). The 16-member Maritime Safety Committee Safety meets annually and submits
safety proposals to the Assembly. Id. Several subcommittees work on specific maritime
issues, "such as the carriage of dangerous goods, radio-communications, fire protection,
ship design and equipment, lifesaving appliances, and cargoes and containers." Id.
179. See Background Note, supra note 27 (explaining that Turkey, following interna-
tional practice, brought to IMO its traffic separation schemes, which form important
part of 1994 Turkish Regulations).
180. See Scharfenberg, supra note 30, at 361 (discussing IMO's response calling for
less restrictive measures than those instituted in 1994 Turkish Regulations).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. IMO Rules and Recommendations, supra note 169; see Scharfenberg, supra note
30, at 361, 362 (describing IMO Rules and Recommendations as less restrictive than
1994 Turkish Regulations). Unlike the 1994 Turkish Regulations, the IMO Rules and
Recommendations provision that vessels navigating through the Straits exercise dili-
gence and regard for the traffic separation schemes utilized in Straits, does not require
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Regulations because they merely strongly recommend, 84 rather
than expressly require, participation in the reporting system set
up by Turkey.1" 5 Likewise, the IMO Rules and Recommenda-
tions strongly recommend, but do not require, having a Turkish
pilot on board Turkish flag vessels to aid in navigation through
the Straits.1 86 The IMO Rules and Recommendations further
recommend daylight navigation of the vessels with a draught 87
greater than fifteen meters and vessels over 200 meters in
length.188 Unlike the 1994 Turkish Regulations that authorize
Turkey to prohibit a vessel that does not comply with the traffic
separation scheme from passing through the Straits,' 89 Rule 1.2
of the IMO Rules and Recommendations suggests that the non-
compliant vessel inform the Turkish authorities in advance that
it cannot comply, thus enabling Turkey to accommodate it by
temporarily suspending that particular aspect of the traffic sepa-
ration scheme.' 90
In essence, the IMO Rules and Recommendations attempt
strict obedience to the separation schemes and does not provide for any forms of pun-
ishment. Id. at 362.
184. See IMO Rules and Recommendations, supra note 169, rules 2.1, 2.2 (providing
"strong recommendations" but not require captains of vessels passing through Turkish
Straits to participate in Turkey's reporting system).
185. See id. (strongly advising captains of passing vessels to give information on
size, ballast, or cargo of vessel, and whether it has any hazardous or noxious cargo on
board).
186. See id. rule 3.1 (providing that "[m]asters of vessels passing through the Straits
are strongly recommended to avail themselves of the services of a qualified pilot in
connection with the requirements of safe navigation").
187. See THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 433 (1967)
(defining vessel's draught (chiefly British, variant of draft) as depth to which vessel is
immersed when bearing given load).
188. See IMO Rules and Recommendations, supra note 169, rule 4.1 (recommending
vessels with "a maximum draught of 15 m[eters] or more and vessels over 200 m[eters]
in overall length are advised to navigate the straits in daylight.").
189. See 1994 TURKISH REGULATIONS, supra note 3, art. 29 (limiting access of cer-
tain types of vessels to Straits). Article 29 of 1994 Turkish Reulations allows the Turk-
ish authorities to decide whether to allow a vessel into the Straits on the basis of consid-
erations such as the morphological and physical structure of the Straits, the vessel's
dimensions and maneuverability, the safety of life, property, and the environment, and
maritime traffic conditions. Id.
190. See IMO Rules and Recommendations, supra note 169, rule 1.2 (providing that
vessels, unable to comply with traffic separation schemes "shall inform the traffic con-
trol station well in advance. In such circumstances, the competent authority may tem-
porarily suspend the particular TSS, or section[s] of it"). In addition, Rule 1.3 suggests
that to ensure safe transit of the non-compliant vessel, Turkey may temporarily suspend
two-way traffic and regulate one-way traffic to maintain a safe distance between vessels.
Id. rule 1.3.
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to address safety concerns of navigation in the Straits raised by
Turkey, but in a manner consistent with the Treaty of Mon-
treux.191 After recommending in 1994 some important changes
for the 1994 Turkish Regulations to make them acceptable
among the international community, 192 a Working Group of the
IMO's Maritime Safety Committee issued a 1997 report that re-
viewed the 1994 Turkish Regulations, offered possible amend-
ments, and revised recommendations addressed to the Govern-
ment of Turkey.' 93 Turkey, however, neither accepted the IMO
recommendations in 1994,194 nor approved the 1997 Working
Group's report195 and insisted on its right to regulate the Turk-
ish Straits unilaterally.'
96
191. See Scharfenberg, supra note 30, at 364 (characterizing method of application
of IMO Rules and Regulations as such that all courses of action left unstated in IMO
Rules and Regulations should be considered inappropriate for proper administration
of transit passage in Turkish Straits).
192. See Schweikart, supra note 19, at 35-38 (discussing IMO Maritime Safety Com-
mittee resolutions concerning safety measures in Turkish Straits).
193. See TSS in Strait of Istanbul, Strait of Cannakale and Sea of Marnara Discussed
(visitedJan. 18, 1999) <http://www.imo.org/imo/news/297/nav432.htrn> (on file with
the Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafter TSS in Strait of Istanbul] (reporting
on IMO Maritime Safety Committee's discussion of proposed amendments and modifi-
cations to Traffic Separation Schemes that were established in Turkish Straits in 1994).
The IMO web site informs that a Working Group on ship's routing issued a report that
offered (1) "Ships' Routeing Measures in the Straits of Istanbul, the Strait of Cannakale,
and the Sea of Marmara" with possible amendments, (2) a draft of revised "Rules and
Recommendations on Navigation through the Straits of Istanbul, the Strait of Can-
nakale, and the Sea of Marmara," (3) draft recommendations addressed to the Govern-
ment of Turkey, and (4) report to the Assembly. Id.
194. See Rank, supra note 4 (reporting on Turkey's reasons of rejecting IMO report
on safety). Mithat Rende, Turkish representative at the IMO, said that the IMO report
"doesn't deal proportionately with safety" and puts too much stress on speeding up
traffic. Id. Joe Atkinson, a partner in the marine casualty department of London law
firm Sinclair, Roche & Temperley, commented that "Turkey wants to impose its own
solution and the international shipping community is very fearful" and that "Turkey was
a little unreasonable in rejecting out of hand the IMO proposals." Id.; see Schweikart,
supra note 19, at 47 (explaining that, although IMO issued IMO Rules and Recommen-
dations in May 1994, Turkey unilaterally implemented 1994 Turkish Regulations in July
of 1994 in contravention of IMO Rules and Regulations.)
195. See TSS in Strait of Istanbul, supra note 193 (explaining that Turkey did not
approve Working Group's report despite its approval by Sub-Committee); see also War-
ren, supra note 23, at *12 (reporting that Turkish delegation refused to participate at
June 1997 meeting of IMO's Maritime Safety Committee discussing 1994 Turkish Regu-
lation and left in protest).
196. See Bird, supra note 4, at 44 (quoting Resat Ozkan, former Turkish Undersec-
retary for Maritime Affairs, who said: "We are not prepared to discuss the legislation of
the regulations with anyone. These rules are an internal matter."); see also Schweikart,
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According to one commentator,1 97 the IMO averted the use
of force in the dispute because it provided sovereigns, busi-
nesses, and environmental organizations with a forum for inter-
national debate on the Turkish Straits problem. 9 ' To keep the
current controversy under control, this commentator recom-
mends that the IMO's Maritime Safety Committee should adopt
temporary procedures to handle pressing maritime matters."' 99
Such procedures would assure prompt consideration of Turkey's
concerns as well as buy the IMO some time to further evaluate
the situation and determine the best resolution of the issue.2 ° °
Such procedures would also prevent Russia from repeatedly rais-
ing the Straits problem during the interim period and compel
Turkey and Russia to interact within an international forum. 2
0 1
The commentator concludes that further efforts to improve effi-
ciency in the IMO's processes would help find a solution to the
issue of regulation in the Turkish Straits based on merit, rather
than on oil interest. 20 2
supra note 19, at 44-45 (pointing out that the IMO process lack of progress caused
Turkey to call it "exercise in futility").
197. Schweikart, supra note 19, at 20.
198. See id. at 42-43 (praising IMO process as forum for informed debate advanc-
ing peaceful evolution of maritime regulation in Turkish Straits). This debate is very
important, considering that the first wars of the post-Cold War era, the Gulf War and
Russia's battle for pipelines in Chechnya, revolved around oil. Id. There was a lot of
pressure from Russia on Azerbaijan for a stake in its oil consortium. Id. Such pressure
was evidenced in Russian support of Azerbaijan's enemy Armenia and in arrangement
of coups within Azerbaijan. Id. Violent clashes for control over the oil resources have
already begun in Central Asia. Id. at 42. Attempted assassination of Eduard
Shevardnadze, President of Georgia, could be viewed as Russian-inspired warning in-
tended to eliminate his support for oil pipeline through Georgia. Id.; see Walker, supra
note 19, at T6 (noting that Shevardnadze is convinced that car bomb that wounded him
in August was warning ordered from Moscow). In view of these facts, Schweikart con-
cludes, the danger of the forceful attempt to solve the controversy between Russia and
Turkey is quite real. Schweikart, supra note 19, at 43.
199. See Schweikart, supra note 19, at 49 (arguing that submission of Turkish
Straits question to working group of signatories of Treaty of Montreux could improve
compliance with IMO Rules and Regulations).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 50. Schweikart concedes, however, that the problem did not disappear
and that the question of whether the 1994 Turkish Regulations comply with interna-
tional law, the IMO Rules and Recommendations, and the Treaty of Montreux remains
open. Id. at 46-47. Turkey, in protecting its interests in the Turkish Straits, acted uni-
laterally, in contravention of the IMO Rules and Recommendations. Id.; see Warren,
supra note 23, at *12 (explaining that IMO has purely consultative character and deci-
sions of IMO or any of its committees are not mandatory). Turkey's submission of its
draft of the 1994 Turkish Regulations to IMO fulfilled Turkey's obligations as a party to
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III. BECAUSE RUSSIA WILL MOST LIKELY CONTINUE TO
CHALLENGE THE 1994 TURKISH REGULATIONS,
AND BECAUSE THE IMO'S RESOLUTIONS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS BIND NEITHER TURKEY
NOR RUSSIA, TURKEY SHOULD ADOPT UNCLOS AS
THE BINDING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME
OF THE TURKISH STRAITS
The conflict in the Turkish Straits creates a potentially dan-
gerous situation in the Black Sea region. The international dis-
pute primarily between Turkey and Russia over the legality of
the 1994 Turkish Regulation has intensified.2 °3 Turkey claims
the right to regulate navigation in the Turkish Straits because of
legitimate environmental concerns.20 4 Russia claims that Turkey
restricts traffic through the Straits to generate oil money and
more power in the region. 20 5 Because each side views its inter-
ests as critical, it is very difficult to find a compromise that will
satisfy both countries. 20 a Time is running out, however, as the
start of the Caspian oil shipments may trigger a full scale interna-
tional conflict and, possibly, the use of force. 20 7 Failure to pre-
vent this conflict through compromise will jeopardize the envi-
ronment, the safety of navigation in the Turkish Straits, and,
most importantly, the safety of the twelve million residents of
Istanbul . 2 0  Because of Turkey's insistence on the legitimacy of
the 1994 Turkish Regulations and the international community's
reliance on the IMO's processes that have not resolved the Turk-
ish Straits problem, Turkey should adopt UNCLOS as the bind-
IMO. Id. Some IMO member states "have attempted to use IMO as a political platform
against Turkey, despite IMO's expressly stated non-political character." Id.
203. See supra notes 4-19, 131-38, 150, and accompanying text (discussing raising
tensions in Turkey-Russia dispute revolving around 1994 Turkish Regulations, right of
free transit through Turkish Straits, and export route of Caspian oil).
204. See supra notes 139-49 and accompanying text (discussing Turkey's concerns
about safety of navigation and environment in Turkish Straits).
205. See supra notes 17, 132-33, and accompanying text (discussing Russia's claim
that 1994 Turkish Regulations are used by Turkey to force construction of Baku-Ceyhan
pipeline).
206. See supra notes 19, 132-38 and accompanying text (discussing conflicting in-
terests of Russia and Turkey concerning transportation route of Caspian oil).
207. See supra notes 18-19, 136-38, and accompanying text (discussing possibility of
confrontation that may decide Europe's access to enormous estimated oil reserves that
can generate US$100 billion of revenues over next 30 years).
208. See supra notes 141-48 and accompanying text (discussing concerns of Turkey
over safety of Istanbul in connection with possible oil tanker disaster).
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ing legal regime that would provide internationally-accepted
navigational rules and address the safety of navigation and envi-
ronmental concerns.
A. Turkey's Insistence on the Legitimacy of the 1994 Turkish
Regulations and the International Community's Reliance
on the International Maritime Organization's Processes for Resolving
the Controversy over the Turkish Straits Are Futile
Neither the insistence that the 1994 Turkish Regulations
are legitimate and consistent with the Treaty of Montreux"0 9 nor
the reliance on the IMO's processes 210 are likely to help in find-
ing an adequate resolution to the Turkish Straits problem. The
IMO provided Russia and Turkey with means for a peaceful dia-
log about the Turkish Straits controversy. 21 1 This dialog has
been the main instrument for balancing the Turkish Straits situa-
tion.212 The conflict, however, remains unresolved and may now
escalate to a more dangerous level. 211 The IMO did not accept
Turkey's position and only supported a compromise solution. 214
The IMO Rules and Recommendations, however, bind neither
Turkey nor Russia.215 Thus, IMO processes are ineffective for
resolving the Turkish Straits controversy because it lacks binding
209. See supra notes 10, 28, 135, 156-64, and accompanying text (noting Turkey's
position that 1994 Turkish Regulations do not affect or prejudice rights of other na-
tions' ships passing through Turkish Straits under Treaty of Montreux, and reviewing
Scharfenberg's arguments that 1994 Turkish Regulations are consistent with Treaty of
Montreux).
210. See supra notes 177-202 and accompanying text (discussing IMO's process of
resolution of controversy over Turkish Straits and Schweikart's proposition to rely on
expedited interim procedure that would allow IMO's Maritime Safety Committee to
handle imminent maritime issues and to compel Turkey and Russia maintain peaceful
dialog).
211. See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text (discussing IMO process as pro-
viding forum for dialog between Turkey and Russia on Turkish Straits problem).
212. See supra notes 191-93 and accompanying text (discussing IMO's measures to
reconcile 1994 Turkish Regulations with Treaty of Montreux).
213. See supra notes 18-19, 149-50, and accompanying text (discussing conflicting
interests of Russia and Turkey in Turkish Straits and commentator's prediction of con-
frontation over Caspian oil export route).
214. See supra note 194 (noting that, although IMO issued IMO Rules and Recom-
mendations in May 1994, Turkey unilaterally implemented 1994 Turkish Regulations in
July of 1994.)
215. See supra notes 184-90 and accompanying text (noting that IMO Rules and
Recommendations merely recommend or strongly advise but do not require captains to
follow its safety rules).
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force.216
Turkey's insistence on the legality of the 1994 Turkish Reg-
ulations, however, is not reasonable considering their unilateral
nature and their negative effect on the Black Sea states' shipping
industry.217 In addition, Turkey cannot disregard the probability
that tension in the Turkish Straits may escalate as the number of
large ships, mainly tankers, passing through the Straits in-
creases. 2 1  In all likelihood, the AIOC will not build the Baku-
Ceyhan pipeline through Turkey in the foreseeable future,219
and will instead transport the Caspian oil by tankers through the
Turkish Straits. 22° Thus, regardless of Turkish protests, very
soon an armada of tankers221 carrying thousands of tons of oil 222
will arrive at the northern entrance of Bosporus requesting free
passage.
Turkey stands unequivocally determined to prevent oil ship-
ment by tankers through the Turkish Straits. 223 The powerful
Turkish industrial lobby and environmental groups support this
position.2 2 4 In view of the recent economic crisis in Russia and
216. See supra note 196 (noting that Turkey called IMO process "exercise in futil-
ity" because IMO's efforts to reconcile safety and environmental concerns raised by
1994 Turkish Regulations with concerns of freedom of navigation through Turkish
Straits have failed).
217. See supra notes 16, 165-68, and accompanying text(noting that Greek, Rus-
sian, Romanian, Bulgarian, and Ukrainian shipowners are affected by delays causing
multi-million U.S. dollar losses and discussing Russia's claim that Turkey is unreasona-
bly making hundreds of Russian vessels waiting to enter Straits).
218. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing prospects of future in-
crease of number of vessels passing through Turkish Straits, especially due to high
volumes of future shipment of Caspian oil by tankers that would need to pass through
Turkish Straits).
219. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text (discussing opinions that Baku-
Ceyhan pipeline project is currently not viable).'
220. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text (discussing oil transportation
schemes from Caspian to Black Sea ports by Novorossiysk oil pipeline, Georgian line to
Supsa, and planned oil terminal in Odessa, Ukraine).
221. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (noting that Turkey is concerned
about prospect of additional 150 supertankers a year transporting oil from Caspian Sea
to Mediterranean through Turkish Straits).
222. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing that without trans-Tur-
key pipeline for transporting oil, current number of vessels transiting Turkish Straits
will double and may result in gridlock, environmental disaster, or both because about
45 million tons of crude oil and 13 billion square meters of gas will have to be trans-
ported annually by tankers through Turkish Straits ).
223. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text (reporting Turkish threat to dis-
allow oil tankers to pass through Turkish Straits).
224. See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text (discussing Turkish Lobby's
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surrounding countries, however, it is highly unlikely that Russia
would concede to the legality of the 1994 Turkish Regulations
limiting tanker passage through the Straits and thus lose billions
of U.S. dollars of revenues from the export of oil resources.225
So far, no efforts have succeeded in reconciling the two coun-
tries' positions.2 2 6
B. To Promote a Peaceful Resolution of the Turkish Straits Problem,
Turkey Should Adopt UNCLOS as the Binding Legal
Regime for the Straits
In order to promote the peaceful resolution of the Turkish
Straits problem, Turkey should adopt UNCLOS as the binding
regulatory scheme for the Turkish Straits. The international
community must be able to rely on an unambiguous legal re-
gime for the governance of passage through the Turkish Straits.
Such a regime should provide an authoritative international fo-
rum that would serve as an impartial arbitrator in settling par-
ties' disputes. This forum's decisions should be legally binding,
unlike those of the IMO. 2
2 7
To establish such a regime, it would be viable to terminate
the Treaty of Montreux 228 and to declare UNCLOS the binding
legal regime for the Turkish Straits229 because this action would
threats to block Turkish Straits to press its demands). The demands include significant
restrictions on traffic through Bosporus, such as restrictions on the size of vessels al-
lowed to transit the Straits and a gradual decrease in the amount of hazardous load
carried involving banning tankers with a load capacity above 20,000 tons and a length
of more than 150 meters. Id.
225. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (describing expected revenues from
Caspian oil export).
226. See supra notes 194-96 (describing futility of IMO's efforts to reconcile safety
and environmental concerns raised by 1994 Turkish Regulations with concerns of free-
dom of navigation through Turkish Straits).
227. See supra notes 184-88 and accompanying text (discussing purely advisory
character of IMO Rules and Recommendations and IMO's decisions).
228. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text (discussing that Treaty of Mon-
treux authorizes any party to terminate it at any time by declaring party's withdrawal
from Treaty or by declaring rebus sic stantibus).
229. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text (noting that UNCLOS does not
presently apply to Turkish Straits because of Article 35(c) of UNCLOS); see also
Scharfenberg, supra note 30, at 390-92 (suggesting that it may be to Turkey's advantage
to denounce Treaty of Montreux and argue that UNCLOS applies as legal regime of
Turkish Straits). The advantage would be because UNCLOS authorizes Turkey to use
traffic separation schemes and other rules in such way as to further safe navigation and
environmental protection. Id. at 391. UNCLOS may also become the legal regime of
the Turkish Straits as customary international law provided that all interested parties
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avoid a long and complicated process of calling a new interna-
tional conference and negotiating new terms for passage
through the Straits.23 ° Upon termination of the Treaty of Mon-
treux, Turkey should immediately adopt the new legal regime
for the Turkish Straits. Otherwise, the custom of free navigation
in the Straits that governed before the Treaty of Montreux
would apply,231 and Turkey would face the same problems as it
does now. 232 To avoid these problems, Turkey should denounce
the Treaty of Montreux and accede to UNCLOS, 23 3 thereby
adopting UNCLOS's rules of transit passage in straits used for
international navigation 234 as the binding legal regime for the
Turkish Straits. 2 35
This course of action would benefit Turkey for a number of
reasons. First, Turkey needs a sound and internationally-recog-
nized legal foundation to assert its right to regulate maritime
traffic to ensure safety and to protect the environment in the
Straits. The Treaty of Montreux fails to accomplish these pur-
poses because it is outdated 236 and hard to reconcile with the
accept it. Id. at 392. If UNCLOS were to replace the Treaty of Montreux, it would
likely do so in its capacity as customary international law because Turkey did not sign
UNCLOS when the document was released for signature. Id. at 393. Scharfenberg
concedes, however, that "the rules pertaining to the legitimacy of customary interna-
tional law would be stretched to the limit" if UNCLOS became the legal regime of the
Turkish Straits as customary international law over Turkey's objections. Id.
Scharfenberg concludes that Turkey is justified in taking the unilateral action in estab-
lishing 1994 Turkish Regulations that are consistent with international law and the
Treaty of Montreux. Id. at 395.
230. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text (reviewing procedure of amend-
ing Treaty of Montreux under Article 29 of Treaty of Montreux and vote requirements
in order to adopt such amendments).
231. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (explaining that, in case of Treaty of
Montreux termination, Turkish Straits' default regime of free transit may be either ab-
solute free passage or general freedom of navigation limited by needs of Turkey and
other Black Sea states).
232. See id. (noting that default regime of free transit in Turkish Straits would pose
similar problem of reconciliation of 1994 Turkish Regulations with principle of free
transit as one of reconciliation of 1994 Turkish Regulations with Treaty of Montreux).
233. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing UNCLOS provision
that any state can adopt UNCLOS by accession).
234. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text (discussing UNCLOS regula-
tion of straits used for international navigation).
235. See supra'notes 116-19 and accompanying text (noting that, among Black Sea
States, only Turkey has neither signed nor acceded to UNCLOS).
236. See supra note 162 and accompanying text (noting that outdated Treaty of
Montreux caused international tension and confusion).
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1994 Turkish Regulations. 37 Second, the termination of the
Treaty of Montreux would be more efficient than renegotiating
the Treaty of Montreux. Because the 1994 Turkish Regulations
infringed interests of Russia and other parties238 who are also
members of the Treaty of Montreux, 2 9 Russia and other parties
will probably oppose the changes that Turkey needs. Yet, the
1994 Turkish Regulations are largely consistent with UNCLOS
provisions regulating transit passage through the straits used for
international navigation. 240 Finally, UNCLOS is a modern, effec-
tive, and globally-recognized 241 body of international law. Thus,
Black Sea shipping dependent nations such as Russia, Bulgaria,
Greece, Romania, and Georgia who are already parties to UN-
CLOS24 2 would not be able to claim that UNCLOS's regulations
of the Turkish Straits are arbitrary or illegal.
The only trade-off for Turkey would be that UNCLOS's pro-
visions do not authorize the coastal state to close navigation
through a strait for maintenance purposes, 243 as the 1994 Turk-
ish Regulations provide. 244 Turkey can use this trade-off, how-
ever, as powerful leverage when it enforces its regulations of traf-
fic in such a manner as to minimize the risk of collisions and to
protect the environment of the Straits. Although such enforce-
ment may impose some extra requirements on the vessels pass-
237. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing opinion that Treaty of
Montreux is inadequate to deal with environmental problems of Turkish Straits).
238. See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text (discussing Greek, Russian,
Romanian, Bulgarian, and Ukrainian interests in shipping through Turkish Straits and
noting that shipowners from these nations are affected by delays causing multi-million
U.S. dollar losses).
239. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (naming such Black Sea nations as
Russia, Bulgaria, and Romania, which are parties to Treaty of Montreux).
240. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text (explaining that, under UN-
CLOS, states bordering straits may adopt laws and regulations relating to transit passage
through straits with respect to safety of navigation and regulation of maritime traffic;
prevention, reduction, and control of pollution; fishing vessels; and, enforcement of
fiscal, customs, immigration, or sanitary laws of state).
241. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (stating number of signatories and
parties of UNCLOS).
242. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text (noting that Russia, Bulgaria,
Romania, and Greece ratified UNCLOS; Georgia adopted UNCLOS by accession;
Ukraine signed but has not ratified UNCLOS).
243. See supra notes 92, 100, and accompanying text (explaining that Article 44 of
UNCLOS provides that "there shall be no suspension of transit passage").
244. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (explaining that Article 24 of 1994
Turkish Regulations authorizes Turkey to close the Straits temporarily for maintenance
purposes, while Article 44 of UNCLOS does not allow suspension of transit passage).
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ing the Straits, the regulations would still be consistent with UN-
CLOS provisions regulating transit passage in straits used for in-
ternational navigation.24
Another advantage of adopting UNCLOS as the legal re-
gime of the Turkish Straits is that UNCLOS is better suited to
deal with disputes than the Treaty of Montreux. UNCLOS pro-
vides an authoritative international court to which the parties
can turn to resolve their differences.246 The International Tribu-
nal on the Law of the Sea is a permanent institution established
by and linked to UNCLOS.2 47 In addition to the International
Tribunal on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS provides parties with
the highly flexible means of dispute resolution and offers the
parties such options as arbitration and use of the International
Court of Justice.24
CONCLUSION
UNCLOS rules of transit passage provide a viable alternative
to the 1994 Turkish Regulations. Although Turkey is not a party
to UNCLOS, adopting UNCLOS as a new legal regime of the
Turkish Straits at this time will probably benefit Turkey because
not only is navigational and environmental safety in the Turkish
Straits at stake, but also the safety of the twelve million residents
of Istanbul. UNCLOS provides the modern, comprehensive,
and widely-recognized regulatory scheme for straits used for in-
ternational navigation. Its authoritative international tribunals
provide the means for peaceful dispute resolution. In sum,
adopting UNCLOS as the new legal regime of the Turkish Straits
should prevent confrontation in the region by providing the in-
ternationally-accepted rules of transit for the Turkish Straits and
by establishing the legal foundation for the implementation of
maritime traffic rules that address -the safety of navigation and
environmental concerns raised in the 1994 Turkish Regulations.
245. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text (describing UNCLOS's Part III
provisions promoting safety of navigation and prevention, reduction, and control of
pollution).
246. See supra notes 120-28 and accompanying text (discussing UNCLOS's proce-
dure of binding dispute resolution mechanism).
247. See supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text (discussing UNCLOS's avail-
able tribunals that deal with parties' disputes concerning interpretation or application
of UNCLOS's provisions).
248. See supra notes 123-28 and accompanying text (explaining that judgments of
these tribunals are binding on parties to UNCLOS).
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